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FIGHTING THE NEW WARS OF RELIGION: THE
NEED FOR A TOLERANT FIRST AMENDMENT
Leslie C. Griffin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Religious wars have broken out around the country about the legality of gay
marriage, the consequences of gay ordination for property ownership, the funding
of faith-based organizations and the placement of crosses and Ten Commandments
(but not Seven Aphorisms) on public land. To resolve such impassioned disputes,
Americans traditionally look to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,
which state “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 Unfortunately, the Court’s modern
decisions interpreting those clauses have shed more heat than light on the
discussion and have provoked ongoing controversy instead of any settled resolution
of the issues. In modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, for example, the
Court for many years identified “separation of church and state” as its guiding
principle and frequently applied “strict scrutiny” to laws that burdened the right of
Free Exercise.2 Over time, however, dissatisfaction erupted with separationism’s
perceived hostility to religion, and the Court sought more neutral approaches to the
Religion Clauses. On the establishment side, it gradually allowed more funding of
religion, most notably permitting parents of religious schoolchildren to use
vouchers and upholding aid that was neutrally given to religious and non-religious
schools alike.3 The Court also adopted a more neutral theory of the Free Exercise
Clause, holding in the controversial 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith
that, because all citizens are subject to “neutral laws of general applicability” and
no citizen is above the law, strict scrutiny does not apply to laws that
unintentionally burden free exercise.4 Meanwhile, as long as Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor remained on the Court, the test for public displays such as the Ten
Commandments and for government religious speech and prayer was whether a
reasonable observer would conclude that the government was endorsing religion in
its actions.5
Although the new neutral Establishment Clause decisions have been politically
popular for directing government resources to religious citizens, Smith and free
exercise law have been less accepted. In response to the lobbying of many

* Professor, Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center;
B.A. University of Notre Dame, 1978; M.A., M. Phil., Ph.D. Yale University (Religious Studies), 1984;
J. D. Stanford Law School, 1992. I am grateful to Aaron Bruhl, Kang Chen, Kathleen Clark, Craig
Conway, David Dow, Wade Haaland, Gerry Moohr, Nick Oweyssi and Ron Turner for their assistance
in developing the ideas in this essay.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
2. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
4. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
5. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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religious groups, Congress immediately rejected Smith, passing a Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),6 which initially applied to both the federal
government and the states until the Supreme Court ruled that Congress lacked the
power to apply RFRA to the states.7 RFRA still applies to the federal government.
Thereafter Congress failed to pass the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA),8
but succeeded with the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA),9 an unprecedented federal intervention into local zoning decisions.10
The state and federal courts have also had a difficult time interpreting Smith, which
the Supreme Court has not revisited since 1990, as well as the federal and state
RFRAs that undermine Smith. On the endorsement front, in 2005 the Justices split
on the Ten Commandments cases, allowing a monument to remain on display on
the Texas state capitol grounds while ordering the removal of a Ten
Commandments display from a Kentucky courthouse.11
With the Religion Clauses jurisprudence in a jumble and subject to varying
degrees of political and popular support, it is no surprise that cases about public
prayer and the Ten Commandments, property and religious freedom, continue to be
filed, and that citizens dispute the appropriate role of religion in passing laws about
gay marriage and funding faith-based organizations (FBOs). The environment now
mistakenly favors religion instead of religious liberty and fosters wars of religion
instead of peaceful tolerance. To reinvigorate the ideal of religious liberty, this
Article advocates a return to the roots of the First Amendment in the principle of
religious tolerance or toleration.12 I argue that the First Amendment is
misinterpreted whenever its roots in tolerance are neglected, as they have been in
the Court’s Religion Clauses cases as well as in contemporary politics.
A focus on tolerance offers three important reminders about the appropriate
role of religion in American democracy. First, because toleration is a political and
legal principle, toleration is skeptical about religious truth-claims and accordingly
denies the state the power to enforce religious “truth” through force or law.
Second, tolerance protects the individual against the power of both church and
state. Third, toleration must extend beyond the diversity among Christian sects of
old Europe and the young United States and stretch in directions not anticipated by
the Framers. The United States is now the “world’s most religiously diverse
nation.”13 As in the past, acceptance of diversity is more likely to begin with a
principle of toleration rather than with alternative theories of respect for persons,
equality, or liberty of conscience.
In Part II, I describe the theory of tolerance that undergirds the First
Amendment and sheds light on its interpretation in modern surroundings. Part II-A

6. 42 U.S.C § 2000bb (2006).
7. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
8. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
10. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003).
11. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
12. Note: I use the words “tolerance” and “toleration” interchangeably throughout the Article.
13. DIANA ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS BECOME THE
WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION (2002).
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examines toleration’s roots in St. Augustine’s belief that heretics could be
compelled to faith and in the European Wars of Religion in the 16th and 17th
centuries. From the truce of the Wars of Religion arose the new philosophical
principles of tolerance of Pierre Bayle and John Locke that are described in Part IIB. Locke influenced the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, who developed a
government of constitutional tolerance, which is described in Part II-C. Part II-D
then employs the philosophy of John Rawls to develop a modern theory of
constitutional tolerance that is based on legal and political rather than philosophical
and religious principles.
The subsequent parts of the Article illustrate the three claims about tolerance.
In Part III, I explore the debate over gay marriage in order to argue that a tolerant
theory of law and public culture requires legislators and citizens to base their votes
on political not religious reasons. Toleration’s first lesson, that religious truth
should not be imposed by force of law, was repeatedly violated during the
California campaign about Proposition 8, a voter initiative that banned gay
marriage.14
In Part IV, I identify several areas of the law where the courts currently protect
religious organizations at the expense of individuals. Part IV-A uses examples
from tort, property, and employment law to demonstrate that many courts have
forgotten that constitutional tolerance protects individuals from the powers of the
church. Part IV-B argues that a tolerant First Amendment does not allow the
government to fund religious practice or employment discrimination within faithbased organizations, but permits it to give some aid to religious organizations
according to the same criteria met by nonreligious providers.
In Part V, I use two monuments cases—Summum and Buono—to delineate a
tolerant theory of public monuments that is more inclusive of minority religions
like Summum and Buddhism than the current Establishment Clause tests. The
Summum religion, which was founded in Utah in 1975 and describes itself as a
form of Gnostic Christianity, teaches that God originally gave Moses the Seven
Aphorisms.15 The Supreme Court recently ruled against the Summum religion in
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, in which Summum argued that a Utah city
must place a Seven Aphorisms monument alongside the Ten Commandments in a
public park.16 The Court has also granted certiorari in Salazar v. Buono in order to
resolve a longstanding controversy about the presence of a Latin cross at a
California veterans’ memorial,17 where the National Park Service once denied a
request to build a “stupa” (a dome-shaped Buddhist shrine) alongside the cross.18
A tolerant First Amendment imposes two requirements that the Court has ignored:
first, it recognizes that crosses and the Ten Commandments retain their religious
14. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (upholding voter initiative banning gay marriage).
15. Summum.org, About Summum, http://www.summum.org/about.shtml; Summum and
Freemasonry, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/freemasonry.shtml; The Teachings of the Summum
are the Teachings of Gnostic Christianity, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/gnosticism.shtml (last
visited Aug. 28, 2009).
16. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
17. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct.
1313 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009, No. 08-472).
18. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2007).
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character and are not secular; second, it allows such religious displays to stand only
if they are surrounded by other religious monuments and symbols, e.g., the
Summum Aphorisms, the Buddhist stupa, the Jewish Star of David, the Muslim
crescent and star, or the Wiccan pentacle.
In Part VI, I conclude that the current religious diversity of the United States is
reminiscent of the days of the Framers of the Constitution, when the original states
contained established churches from varying sects. Although all those dominant
churches were Christian, the Framers recognized that the states’ political union
could not be based on Christian belief but required a principle of constitutional
tolerance. Today the nation is more diverse than the Framers could have
envisioned. The percentage of Christians in the population continues to decline
and the “Nones”—non-theist and no-religion groups—show the largest net increase
in numbers.19 In such circumstances, “[i]t is safer to trust the consequences of a
right principle than reasonings in support of a bad one,” as James Madison
suggested.20
Following Madison’s guidance, current First Amendment
jurisprudence should abandon the current intolerant wars of religion and return to
the principle of constitutional tolerance, which protects religious liberty instead of
religion.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF TOLERANCE
Tolerance contains the three components of objection, acceptance, and
rejection: we object to something (or someone) because it is false or bad; we
nonetheless accept it, not because it loses its negative qualities, but because other
circumstances give us reason to accept or tolerate it; and at some stage, we reach
the limits of tolerance and therefore reject the idea or person in question.21
Considered in that way, judgments about toleration are complex, requiring
individuals to weigh competing principles and values, as well as negative, always
beginning with a sense of objection to something inferior. “Toleration is always
mere toleration. It is less than equality just as it is distinct from liberty, and it is
sharply at variance with fraternity. For these reasons toleration is far from an ideal
policy; it is contaminated, so to speak, by that very implication of evil which its
meaning contains.”22 Because of tolerance’s negative connotations, it is frequently
rejected as a political principle in favor of loftier ideals of equality, liberty, or
respect. James Madison rejected the negative-sounding tolerance in favor of free
exercise when he drafted the Virginia Bill of Rights and the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, I argue that the First Amendment is misinterpreted if its roots in
tolerance are neglected. Accordingly in this section I explain the modern history of
toleration and the religious, philosophical, political, and legal arguments about
19. See Barry Kosmin & Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey 2008,
http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
20. Edwin S. Gaustad, Religious Tests, Constitutions, and “Christian Nation,” in RELIGION IN A
REVOLUTIONARY AGE 218, 235 (Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert eds., 1994) (quoting Madison’s
“Detached Memoranda,” WM. & MARY Q., 3d ser.3, 554-56 (Elizabeth Fleet ed. 1946)).
21. Rainer Forst, Pierre Bayle’s Reflexive Theory of Toleration, in TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS:
NOMOS XLVIII 78, 79 (Melissa S. Williams & Jeremy Waldron, eds., 2008).
22. Maurice Cranston, Toleration, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 143 (Paul Edwards ed.,
1972) (emphasis in original).
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toleration that provided background to the First Amendment and should guide its
interpretation today. From that history I develop three principles that are then
illustrated in the rest of the Article. First, in the constitutional setting, toleration is
a political and legal principle that is skeptical about religious truth-claims and
accordingly denies the state the power to enforce religious “truth” through force or
law. Second, tolerance protects the individual against the power of both church
and state. Third, although toleration arose primarily from the diversity among
Christian sects in Europe and the young United States, the United States is now the
“world’s most religiously diverse nation,”23 encompassing Muslims, Buddhists,
Sikhs, Hindus, Atheists, and increasing numbers of nonreligious, as well as Jews
and Christians.24 Tolerance is more able to accept the new diversity than
traditional interpretations of free exercise and establishment.
A. The Wars of Religious Intolerance
In European history, the modern principle of toleration developed in reaction
to Europe’s background culture of “coercive uniformity” of Christian church and
state and the 16th and 17th century Wars of Religion among the Christian
churches.25 That “coercive uniformity” can be explained by considering the
religious argument of the great Christian theologian, Saint Augustine of Hippo,
who wrote in a famous fifth-century letter that force could be used to convert
individuals to the Christian faith: “You are [mistakenly] of opinion that no one
should be compelled to follow righteousness; and yet you read that the householder
said to his servants, ‘Whomsoever you shall find, compel them to come in.’”26
The notorious words “compel them to come in” are from a parable in the New
Testament’s Gospel of Luke, where Jesus speaks of a man who invited many guests
to his banquet. After the invited guests sent excuses,
[T]he householder in anger said to his servant, “Go out quickly to the streets and
lanes of the city, and bring in the poor and maimed and blind and lame.”
And the servant said, “Sir, what you commanded has been done, and still there is
room.” And the master said to the servant, “Go out to the highways and hedges,
and compel people to come in, that my house may be filled.
27
For I tell you, none of those men who were invited shall taste my banquet.”

Although Augustine’s exegesis of the scriptural text may be questionable, the
“compel them to come in” language—which to modern ears sounds unacceptably
intolerant—was influential in Christian history. The logic of Augustine’s position
was that if Christianity is true, and therefore leads the individual to the highest
good of eternal salvation, then it is good for individuals to be brought to the truth
by any means, including the use of force. Therefore the state should employ its
23. ECK, supra note 13.
24. Cathy Lynn Grossman, Most Religious Groups in USA Have Lost Ground, Survey Says, USA
TODAY, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2009-03-09-american-religionARIS_N.htm.
25. JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 11 (2008).
26. St. Augustine, Letter 93 to Vincentius, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102093.htm (last
visited Aug. 28, 2009) (emphasis added).
27. Luke 14:21-24 (emphasis added).
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force of arms to impose the church’s truth, precisely because the City of Man is
subordinate to the City of God and temporal health is inferior to spiritual. In the
intolerant, pre-Wars of Religion Europe, as well as in the American colonies
founded in that era, the “governing metaphor in church-state relations” was thus for
the “civil magistrate to establish a close, even proprietary relationship with the
church and authorized him to employ force to promote the church’s doctrinal and
material interests.”28 In other words, the state promoted the church’s truth and was
intolerant of all other religions and philosophies.
Increasing divisions among Christians about who possessed the truth—the
Catholic Church or the Protestant Reformers—led to the bitter and brutal 16th and
17th century Wars of Religion, when European states fought to the death for the
sake of religious truth. The exhaustion from those wars eventually persuaded states
to accept their neighbors rather than kill them and a political principle of toleration
emerged.29 Although for religious reasons all sides wanted their vision of the truth
to govern, the death and destruction eventually persuaded nations to build a
political peace that offered an end to warfare. As a leading historian of the English
Civil Wars explained, by 1660 “[t]he conviction had gained strength in English
thought that the ends of national life in the modern world could not be attained
until the divisive and destructive energies of religious conflict had been tamed by
toleration.”30 Thus the belief that one religious truth could govern all nations and
citizens gave way to religious pluralism. The political reality demanded toleration
of conflicting truths.
B. From Religious Intolerance to Philosophical Tolerance
New philosophical accounts of tolerance arose in response to the political and
religious situation in Europe and challenged the old Augustinian framework.
French Protestant Pierre Bayle provided a different interpretation of the “compel
them to come in” passage that had previously justified intolerance. Arguing that
Scripture does not command immoral behavior, Bayle provided a moral reading of
the gospel according to which the “compel them to come in” text is properly read
to mean that unbelievers must be given arguments about faith, but if they refuse the
message there is nothing more that Christians can do.31 Common morality, rather
than religious doctrine, provided the basis for toleration; according to Bayle,
“[b]ecause we have a common morality, there is a vantage point from which
everyone, whatever their religious views, can see the justification for toleration.”32
English philosopher John Locke gave a principled basis to the new ideal of
tolerance; his ideas were influential in the English colonies and later in the framing
of the U.S. Constitution. Locke’s famous A Letter Concerning Toleration focused
28. HUTSON, supra note 25, at 11. See also Forst, TOLERATION, supra note 21, at 85 (an account of
Augustine’s “compel them to come in”).
29. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 1 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (hereinafter
“RAWLS, JUSTICE”).
30. W.K. JORDAN, IV THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND: ATTAINMENT
OF THE THEORY AND ACCOMMODATIONS IN THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS (1640-1660), at 467 (1940).
31. J.B. Schneewind, Bayle, Locke, and the Concept of Toleration, in PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND
THE QUESTION OF INTOLERANCE 3, 7 (Mehdi Amin Razavi & David Ambuel eds., 1997).
32. Id.
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on the individual conscience, arguing contra Augustine that the individual must not
be compelled to religious truth but should freely choose it.33 According to Locke,
“no other human being or institution has any authority regarding the relation
between an individual and God: each one stands alone before God, on the basis of
his own conviction and conscience.”34 That emphasis on the freedom of the
individual conscience led Locke to be suspicious of both states and churches that
attempted to coerce the individual conscience to believe.35 Thus in Locke’s view,
the old coercive uniformity of church and state had to give way to the freedom of
the individual conscience.
On this point of liberty of conscience, Locke’s thought was theological and
Protestant, focusing on the religious reasons for honoring the ideal of free
conscience over the claims of church or state. From such theological beliefs,
however, developed political and legal principles: Because the individual holds the
right to religious freedom, states and churches may not use force to impose “the
truth” upon the citizenry. Focusing on the claims of individual conscience made
Locke more skeptical of the truth claims of the churches, leading to the conviction
that “[n]o side has good reasons to declare its own convictions the only ‘truth’ and
impose it on others by legal or political means.”36 There were limits to Locke’s
tolerance, however. Locke did not tolerate Catholics or atheists,37 arguing “those
are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God.”38
C. From Philosophical to Constitutional Tolerance
Locke’s philosophy and his interpretation of the liberty of conscience
influenced the Framers of the U.S. Constitution.39 The Framers initially
distinguished themselves from the old states of Europe when they drafted the U.S.
Constitution, whose only mention of religion was the text of Article VI: “[N]o
Religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public
Trust under the United States.”40 That groundbreaking language marked a shift
from prior practice in Europe and the states. At the time of the Constitution’s
drafting, eleven states had religious qualifications for government officials,
following the pattern in Britain, where monarchs were required to be members of
the Church of England.41 Although critics of the Constitution feared that the
33. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 1689), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerati.htm.
34. Forst, TOLERATION, supra note 21, at 85.
35. Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, in STANFORD ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/.
36. Forst, TOLERATION, supra note 21, at 90. See also Tuckness, supra note 35.
37. LOCKE, supra note 33. See also Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 856 (1985/1986) (“If the Founders' generation truly sought
freedom for religious beliefs, however, I find no evidence that they were equally concerned with
freedom for irreligion.”).
38. LOCKE, supra note 33. See also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment
Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 376 (2002) (explaining that Locke’s toleration didn’t extend to atheists
(or to other Christians)). See also Kurland, supra note 37.
39. Feldman, supra note 38, at 354.
40. U. S. CONST. Art. VI.
41. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 166 (2005).
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absence of God and religion from a text that lacked prayers, invocations or a
reference to Christianity would undermine the government and even permit “deists,
atheists, &c.” to govern, the secular Constitution was ratified.42 One reason for the
success of a secular Constitution was that “as a practical matter, many delegates
recognized that distinctive historical traditions, colony by colony, region by region,
even decade by decade, made any unifying [religious] assertion highly
problematic.”43
When James Madison was involved in drafting the religious liberty clause of
the Virginia Bill of Rights, which was a precursor to the First Amendment, he
rejected George Mason’s proposal to include the word “toleration” in the clause.44
Instead, the Virginia Bill protected “the full and free exercise of religion.”45
“Madison objected on the ground that the word ‘toleration’ implies an act of
legislative grace, which in Locke's understanding it was.”46 Madison, whose
suspicion of the state led him to draft a Constitution that created a government of
limited and enumerated powers, focused on the individual’s right to religious
freedom against the state, not on the state’s decision to honor religious freedom.47
Although Madison originally believed that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary
because the Constitution gave the government no power over religion, he
participated in drafting the original amendments in order to secure the
Constitution’s ratification. His early drafts of the First Amendment repeatedly
recognized the “equal rights of conscience,” but the conscience language
disappeared during the House and Senate conferences, and the final language of the
First Amendment became “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”48
Madison’s arguments about religious liberty in Virginia and in Congress
should not be interpreted as opposition to tolerance. The Free Exercise Clause
protected liberty of conscience as an individual right and not as a gift of the
government. That interpretation of liberty arose from the old European concept of
toleration that kept the peace among warring factions.49 According to the late
constitutional scholar Philip Kurland, the Establishment Clause then provided a
“new concept” that protected and extended toleration, namely the separation of
church and state:
[T]he separation clause had a greater function than the assurance of toleration of
42. Gaustad, supra note 20, at 225-26.
43. Id. at 225.
44. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1443 (1990).
45. Id.
46. Id. See also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 555-56 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining Mason’s
and Madison’s approaches to the First Amendment).
47. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 556 (O’Connor,. J., dissenting). See also SANFORD H. COBB, THE
RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 492 (1970) (noting that Madison objected to the word
“toleration” as belonging to “a system where was an established Church, and where a certain liberty of
worship was granted, not of right, but of grace”).
48. MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 7589 (2d ed. 2002). See also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
49. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1961).
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dissenting religious beliefs and practices. To suggest but two lessons of the evils
resulting from the alliance of church and state, there was abundant evidence of the
contributions of the churches to the warfare among nations as well as the conflict
within them and equally obvious was the inhibition on scientific endeavor that
followed from the acceptance by the state of church dogma. . . . Limited powers
of government were not instituted to expand the realm of power of religious
50
organizations, but rather in favor of freedom of action and thought by the people.

Thus in the American setting, the principle of toleration developed into an
individual constitutional right of religious liberty that set limits on both state and
church, the appropriate lesson from the legacy of Europe, where the union of
church and state had constrained religious freedom.
Although Locke influenced the Framers, their work should not be confused
with his.51 We must distinguish constitutional toleration (i.e., the political and legal
principles found in the Constitution) from the religious and philosophical
arguments that support it. The Framers drafted a Constitution, not a philosophical
treatise.
Revulsion at continued bloodshed, belief in a right to form one’s own religious
opinion, appreciation of diversity, the thought that God leads us by different
paths—any of these reasons might move people toward acceptance [of the
principle of tolerance]. We need no agreement on reasons for accepting the
principle. What we ask of those who accept toleration is only a public political
52
commitment.

The meaning of that public political commitment is examined in the next
section.
D. Understanding Contemporary Tolerance
Ironically it was the late philosopher John Rawls, the author of Political
Liberalism, whose theory provided a basis for modern politics that is neither
philosophical nor religious. Rawls’s political theory provides a fuller explanation
of constitutional tolerance in a manner that clarifies the importance of interpreting
the First Amendment to require tolerance rather than a free exercise right to rule by
religion. Four of Rawls’s key concepts shed light on current religious disputes.
Just as many religious groups today insist that their Christian theology must
establish the law, the Warriors of Religion in Europe believed their religion was
true, so they fought to establish it as the religion of the state or prince. First, and in
contrast to the one-true view, Rawlsian liberals, like the Framers, accept pluralism
among people’s comprehensive beliefs;53 in the modern era, no single
comprehensive doctrine compels the allegiance of all citizens. Pluralism is an
abiding feature of our lives and will not fade. Second, a political conception of
justice must therefore be found that does not impose one comprehensive doctrine
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); DAVID A. J.
RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (1993) (for a Lockean interpretation of the Constitution).
52. Schneewind, supra note 31, at 13.
53. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 24-25 n.27 (1993).
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(like Catholicism, Kantianism, Mormonism, Secular Humanism, or Islam) on one’s
fellow citizens.54 Third, the political conception of justice will be based on an
overlapping consensus in which citizens can agree on the political and
constitutional essentials of their society, even though they disagree about their
comprehensive doctrines.55 Fourth, decisions within the overlapping consensus
should be made only on the basis of reasons that appeal to all citizens, and so
citizens must employ public reason.56 Public reason means that citizens should not
appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines but to arguments
that their fellow citizens may “reasonably be expected to endorse.”57 Endorse is
the key word here; I may understand why a faithful Catholic would vote the Pope’s
teachings into law, but, as a non-Catholic, I cannot be expected to endorse
government according to a faith I do not share. A Christian should not ask her
fellow citizens to be governed by the Bible because all citizens cannot endorse the
Bible as a source of law.
These four features of political liberalism explain both the tension between
religion and democracy as well as why toleration is required in a liberal democracy.
Believers instinctively want their own comprehensive perspective to govern all
aspects of life, including legal details about marriage and the family. Yet pluralism
renders this desire impossible unless force is used to impose one’s views on
another. Instead of inflicting their views on others, citizens should meet on the
common ground of political justice, an independent “module” shared by all.
Although in the 17th century, philosophers like Pierre Bayle believed that
“common morality” could unite all citizens to a tolerant perspective, in the pluralist
21st century Americans share no common morality and therefore must be united on
political and legal grounds.
The tolerant citizen recognizes that she may not impose her religious truth on
others, and therefore asks if constitutional principles such as liberty and equality
support a proposed law or not. The discussion should always begin with political
and legal principles. That is not to say that constitutional or political principles
provide easy or determinate solutions in every situation. They should, however,
provide the premises of the argument from which the debate starts. To consider
this point in another context, an analysis of women’s rights that begins with biblical
texts is less likely to support women’s equality than one that starts with the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Religious traditions have different
values from the constitutional tradition; the former should not replace the latter.
From this history, I take three claims about tolerance that are illustrated in the
next three parts of the Article. First, because toleration is a political and legal
principle, toleration is skeptical about religious truth-claims and accordingly denies
the state the power to enforce religious truth through force or law. Second,
tolerance protects the individual against the power of both church and state. Third,
toleration must extend beyond the diversity among Christian sects in old Europe
and the young United States and stretch in directions not anticipated by Locke or

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 225-26.
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the Framers. The United States is now the “world’s most religiously diverse
nation.”58 As in the past, acceptance of diversity is more likely to begin with a
principle of toleration rather than with alternative theories of respect for persons,
equality or liberty of conscience.
In Part III, I explain why the first claim, that religious truth must not be
enforced by law, is confirmed by the recent constitutional controversies
surrounding gay marriage.
III. RELIGIOUS TRUTH MUST NOT BE ENFORCED BY LAW
The intensity of recent debates about the legality of gay marriage confirms that
modern wars of religion can be fought at the ballot box as well as on the battlefield.
Toleration’s first lesson, that religious truth should not be imposed by force of law,
was repeatedly violated during the California campaign about Proposition 8, a voter
initiative that banned gay marriage in response to the California Supreme Court’s
ruling that gay marriage was required by the state constitution’s equal protection
clause.59 In contrast to religious citizens who begin their analysis of gay marriage
with a theological question—is it justified by the Bible, or the Elders, or Mormon
or Catholic Theology, or Papal Teaching—the tolerant citizen recognizes that she
must not impose her religious truth on others and therefore asks if constitutional
principles such as liberty and equality support gay rights or not. The discussion
should always begin with political and legal principles. The following pages
describe the intolerant circumstances in California (in Part III-A) and explain (in
Part III-B) why a theory of tolerance is necessary to correct the situation and
restore the constitutional order.
A. The Religious Debate over Proposition 8
In one television advertising campaign, two actors portraying Mormon
missionaries forced their way into the well-kept home of a married lesbian couple.
“Hi, we’re here from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,” one says:
“We’re here to take away your rights,” says his partner.
The missionaries then rip the wedding rings from the women’s fingers and ransack
their house until they find the women’s marriage license, which they destroy.
“Hey, we have rights,” one of the women says.
60
“Not if we can help it,” answers the missionary.

The ad, depicted above, captured the tone of the debate about Proposition 8, an
initiative to amend the state constitution to recognize “[o]nly marriage between a
man and a woman” in response to the California Supreme Court’s ruling that the
equal protection clause of the California Constitution required the state to legalize
gay marriage.61 During the campaign, several Christian groups, led by the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, vocally supported the proposition and
58. ECK, supra note 13.
59. Strauss, 207 P.3d 48.
60. Jessica Garrison & Joanna Lin, Prop. 8 Protestors Target Mormon Temple in Westwood, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-protest7-2008nov07,0,3827549.story.
61. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).

2010]

A TOLERANT FIRST AMENDMENT

35

contributed large amounts of money to its passage, while gay rights groups
criticized the numerous faith-based attempts to influence the vote. One No-on-8
group created a website to keep track of Mormon contributions to the Yes-on-8
drive and estimated that Mormons had contributed $20 million toward passage of
the initiative. A pro-8 spokesman decried the website and the “despicable” ad:
“I am appalled at the level of Mormon-bashing that went on during the Proposition
8 campaign and continues to this day,” . . . . “If this activity were directed against
any other church, if someone put up a website that targeted Jews or Catholics in a
similar fashion for the mere act of participating in a political campaign, it would
62
be widely and rightfully condemned.”

The complaints of Mormon-bashing were then rebutted with arguments that the gay
rights supporters were debating politics, not religion, and were appropriately
criticizing the political activity of the Mormon Church.
Although the Mormon support for Proposition 8 received much of the media’s
attention, the Mormons were only part of a broad coalition of religious groups who
joined to protectmarriage.com. The campaign for Proposition 8 was “one of the
most ambitious interfaith political organizing efforts ever attempted in the state,” as
Catholics and evangelical Christians participated in large numbers and members of
the Protect Marriage Coalition also “reach[ed] out to Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and
Hindus.”63 “Moreover, political analysts say, the alliances across religious
boundaries could herald new ways of building coalitions around political issues in
California. ‘Pan-religious, faith-based political action strategies . . . I think we are
going to see a lot more of [this] in the future,’” predicted one professor.64 The
Religious Left eventually responded to the Religious Right with videos showing
priests and rabbis explaining their faiths’ support for gay marriage.65 The situation
is reminiscent of the post-Reformation arguments about religious truth, with Right
and Left arguing that their perspectives on the morality of gay marriage were true
and therefore should be imposed as law.
Post-election news stories explained that Proposition 8 passed because of
support from religious voters. “Californians voted their religion, not their political
party, when they pushed Proposition 8 to victory and banned same-sex marriage in
the state . . . . ‘What the exit polls say is that religion trumps party affiliation when
it comes to social issues,’ said Mark DiCamillo, director of the Field Poll.”66
In response to Proposition 8’s success, tens of thousands of protesters picketed
Mormon institutions around the country, from California to New York.67 About
2000 protesters chanted complaints against the church at the Westwood Mormon
62. Garrison & Lin, supra note 60.
63. Jessica Garrison, California Churches Plan a Big Push Against Same-Sex Marriage, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/24/local/me-faith24.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. John Wildermuth, The Voters: Majority of Blacks, Catholics, Who Supported Obama, Backed
Measure, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 6, 2008, at A18.
67. Ben Arnoldy, Gay Activists Protest Mormon Church, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 13, 2008,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1113/p03s07-uspo.html; New Yorkers Protest Gay Marriage Ban
Outside Mormon Church, FoxNews.com, Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/printer_
friendly_story/0,3566,451446,00.html.
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Temple near Los Angeles;68 they shouted “bigots” and “shame on you” at men near
the temple.69
Gay marriage supporters also created a new website,
invalidateprop8.org; “[f]or every $5 donated, . . . a postcard will be sent to the
president of the Mormon church condemning ‘the reprehensible role the Church of
Latter-day Saints leadership played in denying all Californians equal rights under
the law.’”70 “No More Mr. Nice Gay” adorned a placard in San Francisco;71 “Did
you cast a ballot or a stone?”, “Latter Day H8,” and “Church of Mormon” with an
X drawn over the second M to read “Moron” appeared in New York.72 The New
York protesters warned religious groups against taking similar legal action against
gay rights there; they feared success in California would “embolden the religious
right” to “train their eye on other states” such as New York.73
In addition to the picketing, numerous Proposition 8 opponents called for the
revocation of the Mormons’ tax-exempt status, arguing that the church had lobbied
for legislation in violation of the tax code.74 The California Fair Political Practices
Commission investigated the contributions of religious groups to the Yes-on-8
campaign in order to see if the amounts were accurately reported; the Secretary of
State released the figures to the public.75 With the lists of contributors publicly
available, gays and lesbians then boycotted businesses whose owners or employees
had contributed to the pro-8 cause.76
The Proposition 8 supporters then rejoined that they are entitled to “exercis[e]
their constitutional right to freedom of religion” by supporting moral policies
consistent with that faith.77 They also argued that the tax laws support their right to
speak publicly about moral issues without losing their exemption.78 One of their
most visible responses was a full-page ad in the New York Times criticizing the
actions of the gay rights groups as a “mob veto,” accusing the Proposition 8
opponents of practicing “violence and intimidation” against the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religions in order to “cow [their] opponents
into submission,” and identifying the demonstrators as “mobs, seeking not to
68. Karen Grigsby Bates, Gay-Marriage Ban Protesters Target Mormon Church, NAT’L. PUB.
RADIO, All Things Considered, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
96756702.
69. Garrison & Lin, supra note 60.
70. Id.
71. Arnoldy, supra note 67.
72. New Yorkers Protest Gay Marriage Ban, supra note 67.
73. Id.
74. Aurelio Rojas, State to Probe Allegation of Mormon Church Role in Prop 8, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 25, 2008, at 3A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/capitolandcalifornia/story/1425577.html.
75. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, List of “Yes on 8” Contributors,, http://calaccess.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1303282&view=received&psort=FILED_DA
TE&session=2007.
76. Mormon Church Lists More Proposition 8 Expenses, SignonSanDiego.com, Jan. 1, 2009
(recounting changes in figures); Karen Grigsby Bates, Backers of California Gay Marriage Ban Face
Backlash, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story. php? Story
Id=101460517.
77. Bates, supra note 68.
78. John Cadiz Klemack, Patrick Healy & Jon Lloyd, Prop 8 Protesters March into Night,
NBCLOSANGELES.COM, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Protestors_ Signal_
Battle_over_Same_Sex_Marriage_Not_Over.html.
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persuade but to intimidate.”79 NoMobVeto.org warned that “[r]eligious wars are
wrong; they are also dangerous. Those who fail to condemn or seem to condone
that intimidation are at fault as well. Consciously or not, they are numbing the
public conscience, which endangers all of us.”80 And the NoMobVeto group
pledged:
Therefore, despite our fundamental disagreements with one another, we announce
today that we will stand shoulder to shoulder to defend any house of worship—
Jewish, Christian, Hindu, whatever—from violence, regardless of the cause that
violence seeks to serve. Furthermore, beginning today, we commit ourselves to
exposing and publicly shaming anyone who resorts to the rhetoric of anti-religious
81
bigotry—against any faith, on any side of any cause, for any reason.

Meanwhile, some gay activists chided themselves for not anticipating the
strength of the religious pro-8 vote and confronting the Mormons more directly and
explicitly on the basis of their religious dogma: “‘We should have been much
stronger in pointing out the LDS positions: barring women from positions of
power, opposing stem cell research, opposing reproductive choice, contraception,
their historic exclusion of black people from their church until 1978.’”82
At the end of the day, complaints of intolerance were lodged against all sides,
with the religious groups accused of intolerance and bigotry against gays and the
gay groups accused of intolerance and bigotry against religion.83
This situation illustrates my argument that it is dangerous to rip free exercise
from its roots in toleration. The purpose of the First Amendment was to provide an
environment in which everyone’s liberty of conscience was protected and tolerated,
not to authorize citizens to identify their own free exercise as a reason to limit the
constitutional rights of others. Whenever free exercise becomes a justification for
freely imposing one’s religious beliefs on others, religious belief becomes a
weapon rather than a right. Recalling free exercise’s roots in toleration undermines
the contemporary argument that religious citizens have a free exercise right to
impose their religious beliefs on their fellow citizens. Tolerance offers a different
approach than free exercise to the issue of gay marriage.
B. How Tolerance Differs from the Religious Approach to Gay Marriage
As noted above, a central lesson in the history of toleration, from St.
79. NoMobVeto.org, Text of Our New York Times Ad, http://nomobveto.org/nytad.php (last visited
Aug. 28, 2009).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Latter Day Education: When, Why, and How Do We Proceed?, GoodAsYou.org, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.goodasyou.org/good_as_you/2009/02/latter-day-education-when-why-and-how-do-weproceed.html.
83. See http://www.protectmarriage.com/tell (last visited Aug. 28, 2009) (“For your steadfast
support of traditional marriage, the No on 8 campaign has called you ‘intolerant’ and ‘offensive.’ But a
recent string of attacks on Yes on 8 supporters shows that opponents of traditional marriage are anything
but tolerant and respectful of others.”); Kathryn Jean Lopez, Pastoring in Pragmatism, NAT’L. REV.,
Dec. 29, 2008 (“Yes, I know: The conventional wisdom has it that the opponent of gay marriage is the
intolerant one. But can ‘tolerant’ really be the right word to describe this excerpt from a recent
Newsweek cover story on religious conservatives and the gay-marriage debate?”).

38

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

Augustine’s “compel them to come in” to the European Wars of Religion, is that
“government should not use force to try to bring people to the true religion.”84 The
battle of religious truth is unending, and, as NoMobVeto suggests, may turn
violent.85 In Europe, the principle of toleration required all sides in the religious
wars to stop coercing one another to follow the “truth” and to accept—not to like or
agree with—their religious differences. As my first principle holds, toleration is
skeptical about religious truth-claims and accordingly denies the state the power to
enforce religious truth through force or law. When citizens use the force of law to
impose their religious beliefs on their fellow citizens, they violate the principle of
toleration.
In the Proposition 8 discussion, it is indisputable that the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints based its opposition to gay marriage on purely religious
reasons and sources, primarily the Christian Bible and Mormon theology, and
therefore sought to use the power of the law to enforce religious truth. The
religious grounds for Proposition 8 are explained in detail on the Mormon website
about “The Divine Institution of Marriage”:
Marriage is sacred, ordained of God from before the foundation of the world.
After creating Adam and Eve, the Lord God pronounced them husband and wife,
of which Adam said, “Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and
shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.” [Genesis 2:24.] Jesus
Christ cited Adam’s declaration when he affirmed the divine origins of the
marriage covenant: “Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning
made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and
mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore
86
they are no more twain, but one flesh.” [Matthew 19:4-6.]

In 1995, “The Family: A Proclamation to the World” declared the following
unchanging truths regarding marriage:
We, the First Presidency and the Council of the Twelve Apostles of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, solemnly proclaim that marriage
between a man and a woman is ordained of God and that the family is central to
the Creator’s plan for the eternal destiny of His children . . . . The family is
ordained of God. Marriage between man and woman is essential to His eternal
plan. Children are entitled to birth within the bonds of matrimony, and to be
reared by a father and a mother who honor marital vows with complete fidelity.
The Proclamation also teaches, “Gender is an essential characteristic of
individual premortal, mortal, and eternal identity and purpose.” The account in
Genesis of Adam and Eve being created and placed on earth emphasizes the
creation of two distinct genders: “So God created man in his own image, in the
image of God created he him; male and female created he them.” [Genesis
87
1:27].

The church urged its members to donate their time and energy to preserve the
84. Tuckness, supra note 35.
85. NoMobVeto.org, supra note 79.
86. LDS Newsroom,
The Divine Institution of Marriage, Aug. 13, 2008,
http://newsroom.lds.org/ldsnewsroom/eng/commentary/the-divine-institution-of-marriage
(emphasis
added).
87. Id.
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“sacred nature of marriage.”88
In contrast, the gay rights groups relied predominantly on arguments about
equality and liberty, which are legal values enshrined in the U.S. and California
Constitutions and not dependent upon theological reasoning. As noted above,
however, liberal religious groups also filled the airwaves with theological defenses
of gay marriage. The 2008 election revealed, moreover, that some political liberals
are religious conservatives; just like the Mormons, Barack Obama refused to
support equal protection for gay marriage because he believes that marriage is
sacred and gay marriage is prohibited by the Bible. Although Obama did not
endorse Proposition 8, he observed “that marriage, in the minds of a lot of voters,
has a religious connotation. I know that’s true in the African-American [religious]
community, for example.”89 That was true in California as the African-American
religious voters sent Obama to the White House and Proposition 8 to victory.90
Obama’s explicit references to his own Christian faith and faith-based policies
on the campaign trail were consistent with the recent trend for Democrats of faith,
who, disappointed by their losses to the more Republican Religious Right in the
2000 and 2004 elections, have recently sought to attract voters by emphasizing
their own religious values.91 The gay marriage issue, however, which put Obama
on the same side as the Mormons defending sacred marriage instead of equal
protection, is a stark reminder that neither liberal nor conservative religion—no
religion of any sort—is the appropriate basis of the law in a tolerant society.
Tolerance must challenge all attempts of both Religious Right and Left to provide
the content of the law. A tolerant society does not base its laws on religious truth
of any flavor.
On the question of gay marriage, the stance of political justice and public
reason is easy to identify. Unlike Obama or the Mormons, Catholics, or
evangelical Christians of protectmarriage.com, who begin their analysis of gay
marriage with a theological question—is it justified by the Bible, or the Elders, or
Mormon or Catholic Theology, or Papal Teaching—the tolerant citizen recognizes
that she may not impose her religious truth on others, and therefore asks if
constitutional principles such as liberty and equality support gay rights or not. The
discussion should always begin with political and legal principles. That is not to
say that constitutional or political principles provide easy or determinate solutions
in every situation. They should, however, provide the premises of the argument
from which the debate starts. To consider this point in another context, an analysis
of women’s rights that begins with biblical texts is less likely to support women’s
equality than one that starts with the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Religious traditions have different values from the constitutional
tradition; the former should not replace the latter.
This point explains why Obama was mistaken to argue in The Audacity of
Hope “[w]hat our deliberative, pluralistic democracy does demand is that the
religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, rather than religion88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Tracy Baim, Obama Changed Views on Gay Marriage, WINDY CITY TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at 6.
90. Farhad Manjoo, Props to Obama: Did He Help Push California’s Gay-Marriage Ban Over the
Top?, SLATE, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2203912/.
91. RAY SUAREZ, THE HOLY VOTE: THE POLITICS OF FAITH IN AMERICA 280-99 (2006).
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specific, values.”92 The gay marriage debate demonstrates the futility and
dishonesty of the translation enterprise. If Obama and Governor Mitt Romney both
oppose gay marriage because it violates Christian or biblical principles, nothing is
gained if Obama translates the Bible into political language while Romney openly
cites church elders. It is still the rule of religion instead of the rule of law, with
concealed instead of open faith. The Wars of Religion never end if religious
groups work incessantly to turn or translate their theology into law. Religion-based
politics will always give us the back-and-forth of Proposition 8, as groups angrily
seek to make the law consistent with their own religion instead of democratically
seeking the sphere of consensus.
Obama himself contributed to the suspicion and instability that accompany
religion-based policies when it was discovered after the presidential election that as
a state candidate in 1996 he unequivocally supported gay marriage and promised to
“fight efforts to prohibit such marriages.”93 The report raised questions about why
he changed his position.94 “In a January 2004 interview . . . , Obama clearly stated
that lack of support for full marriage equality was a matter of strategy rather than
principle, but in even more recent comments, it appears he is backing off even
further, saying it is more of a religious issue, and also a ‘state’ issue, so he favors
civil unions. Both are compromises most gays do not support.”95 Religious,
political, and strategic all merge into one, which leads to suspicion that religion is
driving policy or being used as a political prop, and shows the inadequacy of
Obama’s “translation” policy.
Whether faith is hidden or open, the legacy of liberal tolerance is the
understanding that democracies cannot be governed by religious principles; the
clash in California illustrates that legal controversies cannot be settled on religious
grounds unless one religion is imposed upon citizens who do not share that faith.
Accordingly, democratic citizens must oppose efforts to turn religious convictions
into law and to re-Christianize our public discourse. Part III-C of this Article
explains why free exercise does not justify the rule of religious beliefs.
C. Free Exercise Does Not Justify Intolerance
The recommendation to base the law on constitutional principles will appear
harsh to some believers who feel “bracketed” or excluded from, or trivialized in,
the public square because of their religion. Originally it was conservative religious
groups who argued that the secularism of modern politics unfairly marginalized
92. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 219 (2006) (emphasis added).
93. Alex Koppelman, Revealed: Obama Used to Support Same-Sex Marriage, Salon.com, Jan. 13,
2009, http://www.salon.com/politics/war_room/2009/01/13/obama_marriage/. (In a response to a Windy
City Times questionnaire, Obama stated, “I favor legalizing same-sex marriages, and would fight efforts
to prohibit such marriages.”).
94. See id. (“The most obvious answer, of course, is politics. Maybe Obama just realizes (correctly)
that same-sex marriage is a political non-starter, while civil unions are relatively popular, so he chooses
to publicly support the feasible position.”). See also Timothy Stewart-Winter, Putting Obama’s
Questionnaire in Context, Jan. 14, 2009, WINDY CITY TIMES, 2009, at 7, available at
http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/gay/lesbian/news/ARTICLE.php?AID=20525 (In 1996, “Obama
was an unlikely candidate, up against a progressive incumbent in a very progressive district, who needed
all the help he could get.”).
95. Baim, supra note 89.
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and derided religious conviction and undermined their religious freedom.96 Now
both conservatives and liberals, led by President Obama, have discovered political
religion:
Surely secularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the
door before entering the public square; Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln,
William Jennings Bryan, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King, Jr.—indeed the
majority of great reformers in American history—not only were motivated by faith
but repeatedly used religious language to argue their causes. To say that men and
women should not inject their “personal morality” into public-policy debates is a
practical absurdity; our law is by definition a codification of morality, much of it
97
grounded in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Obama neglects to mention that the starting point for our law and politics is
precisely the morality that has already been codified into the state and federal
constitutions. Emphasizing its “Judeo-Christian” nature is intolerant of the
Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists and Hindus who populate the United States. Moreover,
there is no “Judeo-Christian tradition” to govern us; the term conflates Judaism
with Christianity. Judaism and Christianity are two separate religions with their
own traditions. Americans share the constitutional tradition and not a JudeoChristian or any other religious tradition. The United States is different from
Christian Europe, where Pierre Bayle could hope for a common morality that
would unite all citizens. The American citizenry is religiously and philosophically
diverse and does not share belief in any Judeo-Christian tradition.
Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King, Jr., did not
impose their version of Christianity upon their fellow citizens; instead they sought
to apply the guarantees protected in the Constitution to everyone. Many of the
Christian churches of their eras supported slavery. As David Richards has
explained, the abolitionist dissent was not successful because it was religious, but
due to its moral independence:
[T]he interpretive understanding of the role of public reason in such abolitionist
dissent is no more its religious or irreligious character than its scientific or antiscientific character, but its critical moral independence in all domains (including
science and religion) in forging arguments of public reason in opposition to the
role that both dominant established science and religion played in the defense of
98
slavery and racism.

The tolerant democracy does not start every discussion anew with the religious
and philosophical commitments of its citizens; instead, it brackets everyone’s
convictions so that peace may reign. A Kantian Californian should not vote the
categorical imperative; a Rawlsian Californian should not vote the difference
principle; a Mormon should not vote the divine teaching on marriage. Although
these are not legal restrictions that can be enforced at the ballot box, a tolerant
society cannot survive without a tolerant culture as well as a tolerant law, where
96. See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA (1984).

97. OBAMA, supra note 92, at 218-19.
98. David A.J. Richards, Public Reason and Abolitionist Dissent, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 787, 835
(1994).
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individuals choose to be tolerant of their fellow citizens. Ideally their religions and
philosophies will motivate them to be tolerant instead of to enforce their religions
on others through their votes. A free exercise that lacks tolerance becomes a
principle of injustice rather than a right of liberty.
Tolerant voting will not excite many passions because toleration is
unsatisfactory in so many ways; as T.S. Eliot remarked, “‘The Christian does not
wish to be tolerated.”’99 Many tolerated religions echo Eliot because “[t]oleration
is always mere toleration. It is less than equality just as it is distinct from
liberty.”100 Maurice Cranston interpreted Eliot’s comment to mean that “[t]he
Christian wanted something better—to be respected, honored, and loved.”101
Within the Proposition 8 debate, even the Mormon church’s definition of tolerance
was Christian and biblical, distinguishing itself from the legal and political
definition of toleration and seeking to replace toleration with the theological and
biblical principle of Christian love. Addressing charges that its stance toward gay
marriage was intolerant, the church argued that the gay
appeal for “tolerance” advocates a very different meaning and outcome than that
word has meant throughout most of American history and a different meaning than
is found in the gospel of Jesus Christ. The Savior taught a much higher concept,
that of love. “Love thy neighbor,” He admonished. [Matt. 19:19.] Jesus loved the
sinner even while decrying the sin, as evidenced in the case of the woman taken in
adultery: treating her kindly, but exhorting her to “sin no more.” [John 8:11.]
Tolerance as a gospel principle means love and forgiveness of one another, not
“tolerating” transgression.
In today’s secular world, the idea of tolerance has come to mean something
entirely different. Instead of love, it has come to mean condone—acceptance of
wrongful behavior as the price of friendship. Jesus taught that we love and care
for one another without condoning transgression. But today’s politically palatable
definition insists that unless one accepts the sin he does not tolerate the sinner.

As Elder Dallin H. Oaks has explained,
Tolerance obviously requires a non-contentious manner of relating toward one
another’s differences. But tolerance does not require abandoning one’s standards
or one’s opinions on political or public policy choices. Tolerance is a way of
102
reacting to diversity, not a command to insulate it from examination.

This extended quotation about the inadequacy of toleration from a religious
perspective reinforces my point that the seemingly negative principle of toleration
may protect more rights than her lofty sisters—love, equality, and even religious
freedom. Where Christian love forbids gay love, toleration accepts it. Without a
basis in toleration, free exercise may become the exercise of religious truth in a
coercive manner. Without toleration, free exercise may limit liberty rather than
enhance it. Without toleration, equality may not extend to sinners. Without
toleration, religious adherents will focus on religious truth and try to impose that
truth on their neighbor in the name of love, rather than accepting that the parties
99.
100.
101.
102.

Cranston, supra note 22, at 143 (quoting T.S. Eliot).
Id.
Id.
LDS Newsroom, supra note 86 (internal citation omitted).
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will always disagree about religious truth and therefore seeking to object and then
accept.
Michael Walzer explained the inevitable discomfort of some religious groups
with tolerance, observing that although they can tolerate minority religious
freedom,
they have no tolerance for personal liberty outside the house of worship. If
sectarian communities aim to control the behavior of their own people, the more
extreme members of religious majorities aim to control everyone’s behavior—in
the name of a supposedly common (Judeo-Christian, say) tradition, of “family
values,” or of their own certainties about what is right and wrong. This is surely
an example of religious intolerance. It is a sign of the partial success of the regime
of toleration, however, that antagonism is not directed against particular minority
religions but rather against the ambience of freedom that the regime as a whole
103
creates.

Walzer’s point was well-illustrated in the debate over Proposition 8, where the
minority religions were recruited to join the coalition to limit social freedoms.
Throughout the Proposition 8 debate, some supporters asserted “if this
proposition had not passed, religious groups could have been forced to conduct
same-sex weddings.”104 Really? A tolerant First Amendment does not go so far; it
objects to the church’s opposition to gay marriage but accepts its free exercise right
not to be coerced into religious rituals. With Locke, constitutional toleration does
not believe in state-enforced, coercive faith. Although divorce is legal, for
example, Christian churches are not legally required to offer communion or
remarriage to the divorced. Ideally and tolerantly, the states will offer nonreligious
marriage to all citizens and the churches will make their theological decisions about
which marriages deserve church approval.
This point about the liberty of churches suggests that a tolerant society respects
the autonomy of churches to make their own decisions about religious matters. In
Part IV, I argue that tolerance sets some limits on religious organizations because
constitutional tolerance must protect individuals against the power of both church
and state.
IV. TOLERANCE PROTECTS INDIVIDUALS AGAINST THE POWER OF BOTH CHURCH
AND STATE
The Free Exercise Clause arose from the Framers’ desire to protect individual
liberty of conscience. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the religious
freedom to believe is absolute,105 thus confirming the inviolability of the individual
conscience, which may not be forced into belief by either church or state.
While recognizing the absolute freedom of religious beliefs, however, the
Court has also recognized that the law may regulate religious acts.106 In an early
ruling, the Court held that a Mormon did not have a free exercise right to practice
103. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 70 (1997).
104. A Mormon Responds to Proposition 8, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 17,
http://www.vanityfair.com/online/politics/2008/11/a-mormon-responds-to-prosition-8.html.
105. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).
106. Id. at 86.
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polygamy;107 more recently, the Court held that a Native American did not have a
free exercise right to use peyote in violation of the drug laws.108 The peyote case,
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, set the current
standard for interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. According to Smith,
religious citizens are not above the law but, like everyone else, are subject to
“neutral laws of general applicability.”109
The rule of Smith prohibits
discrimination on the basis of religion but does not exempt religious believers from
nondiscriminatory laws.110
Although Smith was roundly criticized for eviscerating free exercise,111 its
holding is consistent with a tolerant reading of the First Amendment. The issue of
the range of the government’s power to regulate religious acts can be reworded as a
question about the limits of tolerance. Although we dislike or disagree with our
fellow citizens’ religious actions, we tolerate them unless . . . what? What are the
limits to toleration?
The classic philosophical response to that question comes from John Stuart
Mill’s On Liberty. According to Mill, “the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others.”112 A Millian reading of the Constitution favors the
principle of autonomy and finds in the no-harm principle the appropriate limit of
tolerance. Some scholars have recommended interpreting the First Amendment
from Mill’s perspective because doing so provides a “thick” theory that fully
protects religious liberty. Professor Beattie, for example, has argued that Locke’s
notion of toleration protects only religious belief, not acts, and is consistent with
Smith.113 Beattie prefers Mill, whose principles protect both belief and acts unless
they harm others, and whose philosophy is more consistent with the Supreme
Court’s, pre-Smith, Sherbert line of cases, which held that laws substantially
burdening free exercise must be subjected to strict scrutiny.114
According to the political and legal theory of the Constitution spelled out in
Part III, however, citizens may not privilege their philosophical or religious
theories of the Constitution and impose them on others. A Millian is subjected to
the same restrictions as a Mormon. Mill’s principles of autonomy and no-harm
cannot provide a shared interpretation of the First Amendment. The best way to
avoid privileging a religious or philosophical reading of the Constitution is to hold
all citizens to the same law, as Smith requires. Having a religious law for some but
not others undermines the peace and stability of the tolerant community. Thus the
free exercise protected by the Constitution is not a general principle of autonomy
from the law’s regulation but an effort to identify a law that is shared by all.

107. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
108. 494 U.S. at 890.
109. Id. at 879 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
110. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
111. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
112. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., 1991).
113. James R. Beattie, Jr., Taking Liberalism and Religious Liberty Seriously: Shifting Our Notion of
Toleration from Locke to Mill, 43 CATHOLIC LAWYER 367, 407-08 (2004).
114. Id.
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In the name of free exercise, and even post-Smith, some courts and scholars
have defended a theory of the First Amendment that protects not only Millian
personal autonomy but also “church autonomy,” which is “a constitutionally
protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government
interference.”115 This theory is even more troubling than a personal autonomy
interpretation of free exercise because the history of tolerance recognizes the
dangers that churches may pose to individual religious freedom. A tolerant First
Amendment is wary of the power of churches to oppress individuals and therefore
insists that the First Amendment allows no “citizen [or church] to become a law
unto himself.”116 In contrast to that rule, in tort (Part IV-A(1)), property (Part IVA(2)) and employment law (Part IV-A(3)), the courts have too frequently allowed
the churches to become a law unto themselves in a manner that violates individual
liberty. Thus they choose a standard that tolerance abhors, namely one that
protects institutional churches from legal accountability to their members in the
name of religious freedom.
The ability of churches to undermine individual religious liberty is enhanced
when the government provides funding to the churches to do so, as described in
Part IV-B.
A. Church Autonomy
The Texas Supreme Court recently ignored the lessons of tolerance when it
defended church autonomy to injure a teenage girl during an exorcism.
1. Torts
Laura Schubert was a seventeen-year-old member of the Pleasant Glade
Assembly of God, a Christian church that “believes in the literal teachings of the
Bible with respect to spirits, demons, demon possession, and the ‘casting out’ of
demons.”117 During a weekend spent at her church, while her parents were out of
town, Schubert attended a worship service on Sunday morning, and then collapsed
during a Sunday evening service.118
After her collapse, several church members took Laura to a classroom where they
“laid hands” on her and prayed. According to Laura, church members forcibly
held her arms crossed over her chest, despite her demands to be freed. According
to those present, Laura clenched her fists, gritted her teeth, foamed at the mouth,
made guttural noises, cried, yelled, kicked, sweated, and hallucinated. The parties
sharply dispute whether these actions were the cause or the result of her physical
restraint.
Church members, moreover, disagreed about whether Laura's actions were a ploy
for attention or the result of spiritual activity. Laura stated during the episode that
Satan or demons were trying to get her. After the episode, Laura also allegedly
began telling other church members about a “vision.” Yet, her collapse and
115. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
116. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
117. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 3 n.1 (Tex. 2008).
118. Id. at 3-4.

46

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

subsequent reaction to being restrained may also have been the result of fatigue
and hypoglycemia. Laura had not eaten anything substantive that day and had
missed sleep because of the spiritual activities that weekend. Whatever the cause,
Laura was eventually released after she calmed down and complied with requests
to say the name “Jesus.”
[...]
On Wednesday evening, Laura attended the weekly youth service presided by Rod
Linzay. According to Linzay, Laura began to act in a manner similar to the
Sunday evening episode. Laura testified that she curled up into a fetal position
because she wanted to be left alone. Church members, however, took her unusual
posture as a sign of distress. At some point, Laura collapsed and writhed on the
floor. Again, there is conflicting evidence about whether Laura's actions were the
cause or result of being physically restrained by church members and about the
duration and force of the restraint. According to Laura, the youth, under the
direction of Linzay and his wife, Holly, held her down. Laura testified, moreover,
that she was held in a “spread eagle” position with several youth members holding
down her arms and legs. The church's senior pastor, Lloyd McCutchen, was
summoned to the youth hall where he played a tape of pacifying music, placed his
hand on Laura's forehead, and prayed. During the incident, Laura suffered carpet
119
burns, a scrape on her back, and bruises on her wrists and shoulders.

Afterward, Schubert suffered from depression, suicidal tendencies, anger, weight
loss, and sleeplessness.120 She dropped out of high school and, after being
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder due to the church events, collected
disability payments.121 Laura’s father, Tom, complained to the church’s senior
pastor, Lloyd McCutchen, who decided not to discipline the parties involved.122
Laura and her parents then sued the church, but the Texas Supreme Court
disallowed her tort recovery on the grounds that the First Amendment protected the
church from liability.123
In the name of the First Amendment and a theory that constitutional scholars
have labeled “church autonomy,”124 the courts have frequently protected churches
against the legal claims of their members,125 thus allowing the churches to do what
they wish to members like Laura Schubert. In contrast, a tolerant First Amendment
questions church autonomy because it recognizes the dangers that both state and
church may pose to individual religious freedom. A tolerant First Amendment is
wary of the power of churches to oppress individuals and therefore insists that the
First Amendment allows no “citizen [or church] to become a law unto himself.”126
In other words, both churches and their members must obey the law.
The courts, however, have frequently decided cases by a standard that
tolerance abhors, namely one that protects institutional churches from legal
119. Id.
120. Id. at 4-5.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 264 S.W.3d at 13.
124. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
125. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread
Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225 (2007).
126. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
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accountability to their members in the name of religious freedom.127 The Schubert
case is a prime example. The Schuberts sued the church, the senior pastor, the
youth minister, and other members of the church for negligence, gross negligence,
professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false
imprisonment, assault, battery, loss of consortium, and child abuse. After a first
round of appeals,128 the so-called “religious” claims—gross negligence,
professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of
consortium—were dismissed and the “secular” ones—assault, battery, and false
imprisonment—went to the jury, which awarded Laura $300,000 in compensatory
damages plus $142,438.30 in prejudgment interest against the church defendants.129
The Texas Supreme Court took away Laura’s verdict.130 Although Pleasant
Glade Assembly of God had conceded in its first appeal that liability was
appropriate for the “secular” torts, in its second appeal the church contested the
jury’s verdict on First Amendment grounds.131 With some convoluted reasoning,
the Court ruled the church was not estopped from challenging the verdict because it
had really been arguing all along that it was liable for physical injury only.132
Because Schubert’s case included testimony about emotional harm, the Court ruled,
damages were not permitted under the First Amendment, even for false
imprisonment.133
Consider first the reasons given for barring the “religious” claims—
negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and loss of consortium. The church convinced the appeals court
that because the dispute with Schubert involved the “laying on of hands” it was
purely theological and
would involve a searching inquiry into Assembly of God beliefs and the validity of
such beliefs, an inquiry that is barred by the First Amendment. . . . Regarding
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the First Amendment
gives Pleasant Glade the right to engage in driving out demons—intangible or
emotional harm cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of
134
action against a church for religious practices.

The court employed the mix of arguments that recurs in tort lawsuits involving
religious organizations, namely that there is no possible legal standard of care for
religious professionals because identifying such a standard would involve the
courts in doctrinal judgments that belong to the church.135 The Supreme Court of
Texas majority believed that any discussion of exorcism would involve theological
disputes about what an exorcism is, how it is properly performed, and whether the

127. Hamilton, supra note 125.
128. In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App. 1998).
129. Schubert v. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, No. 141-173273-98, 2002 WL 33966445 (Tex.
Dist. Ct. May 23, 2002).
130. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 264 S.W.3d at 1.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Id. at 8.
133. Id. at 9-10.
134. In re Pleasant Glade, 991 S.W.2d at 89.
135. Id. at 89-90.
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Assembly of God performs exorcisms on its members or not.136
Similar arguments have prevented other courts from recognizing a tort of
clergy malpractice and have freed clergy of liability for inappropriate counseling of
(i.e., sexual advances toward) married persons and minors.137 Such reasoning
enables bad conduct by churches that tort law would otherwise penalize, a worry
that was confirmed by the appeals court’s overbroad statement in Schubert that
“[a]lthough the freedom to act is subject to regulation, this regulation only burdens
purely secular activities that are nonreligious in motivation.”138
The ruling on religious negligence allows a sick teenager who was faint,
hungry, or hypoglycemic from a sleepless night with friends to be negligently
treated by a religious group as long as they call it an exorcism.139 In a similar
manner, parents are frequently not prosecuted for child abuse when they fail to
provide their children with medical care for religious reasons.140
The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling on the “secular” intentional torts—false
imprisonment, assault, and battery—even more completely missed the mark. The
trial court was able to keep evidence about the church’s beliefs about exorcism out
of the trial, and the jury was free under tort law to conclude that Laura had
consented to her church members’ conduct and find no liability.141 Instead, the jury
awarded her damages. Nonetheless, the majority ruled that church and state would
become too entangled if the courts attempted to assess Schubert’s emotional harm
“because the religious practice of ‘laying hands’ and church beliefs about demons
are so closely intertwined with Laura’s tort claim, assessing emotional damages
against Pleasant Glade for engaging in these religious practices would
unconstitutionally burden the church's right to free exercise and embroil this Court
in an assessment of the propriety of those religious beliefs.”142
A better rule, defended by the dissenting justices in Schubert, is that “‘under
the cloak of religion, persons may [not], with impunity,’ commit intentional torts
upon their religious adherents. . . . Unfortunately, this is precisely what the Court's
holding allows.”143 The majority’s holding suggests that religious persons leave the
law outside when they enter the church building, an intolerant standard not only for
adults but especially for minors who have not consented to religious harm. This
“permits characterizing churches as utterly different from other societal institutions
and thus marks churches as alien.”144 The majority’s standard does not even
respect John Stuart Mill’s principle that behavior is legitimately limited when harm
136. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 264 S.W.3d at 11.
137. See, e.g., Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 677 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1998) (court cannot review conduct of priest who told woman God can heal her multiple sclerosis and
then makes sexual advances); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (sexual advances
by church pastor on twelve-year-old girl not justiciable).
138. In re Pleasant Glade, 991 S.W.2d at 88-89.
139. See generally id.
140. See generally SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, WHEN PRAYER FAILS: FAITH HEALING, CHILDREN,
AND THE LAW (2008).
141. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 5.
142. Id. at 11.
143. Id. at 15 (Jefferson, Green, & Johnson, JJ., dissenting).
144. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 339 (1986) (applying alien concept to property, not tort, disputes).
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to others occurs. Religious tolerance should not require deference to the decisions
of a church to harm its members.
2. Property
Deference to churches also predominates in intrareligious property disputes,
which in the past few years have filled the courts as local Episcopal communities
try to leave the national church because of disagreement over gay ordination while
maintaining title to local property. On this subject the courts’ odd deference to
church hierarchies ignores toleration’s legitimate skepticism of church authority
and its rule that churches, like secular organizations, must be subject to the law.
Consider a hypothetical posed by Justice William Rehnquist in a 1976 church
property case:
Suppose the Holy Assembly . . . had a membership of 100; its rules provided that a
bishop could be defrocked by a majority vote of any session at which a quorum
was present, and also provided that a quorum was not to be less than 40. Would a
decision of the Holy Assembly attended by 30 members, 16 of whom voted to
145
defrock [the bishop], be binding on civil courts . . . ?

Rehnquist said no, it would not, but he wrote those words in his dissent in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich against the majority who overturned a
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court supporting the defrocked bishop against the
church’s hierarchy.146 Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion relied on the
“church polity” rule that defers to the leadership of a hierarchical church:
For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by
civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as
binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity
147
before them.

A different rule applies to congregational churches, which are treated like
voluntary associations and held to majority rule and other fair procedures.148 To
date, the Supreme Court has identified only two polities, hierarchical and
congregational, and leaves it to judges to determine which church fits which
model.149
Justice Brennan added the following remarkable comment to his Serbian
Orthodox ruling:
[I]t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are
to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by

145. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 727 (1976) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
146. Id. at 698.
147. Id. at 709.
148. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 270
(2006).
149. See id. Greenawalt and others, have written that the polity rule must be unconstitutional because
it involves the courts in defining what counts as hierarchical and congregational.
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objective criteria. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular
notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly
150
relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.

Similar to the Schubert ruling, the remark suggests that individuals lose their
legal rights when they walk through the church’s front door and that churches are
“alien” institutions with standards unlike other American organizations. “In a
country that extols democracy, most citizens would find it permissible but curious
if all members of hierarchical churches engaged in complete submission to
authority,”151 and many members of hierarchical churches would be surprised to
find that they had abandoned their legal rights when they joined the church.
No wonder Justice Rehnquist objected to Brennan’s Serbian ruling and the
hierarchical polity rule in colorful language:
A casual reader of some of the passages in the Court's opinion could easily gain
the impression that the State of Illinois had commenced a proceeding designed to
brand Bishop Dionisije as a heretic, with appropriate pains and penalties. But the
state trial judge in the Circuit Court of Lake County was not the Bishop of
Beauvais, trying Joan of Arc for heresy; the jurisdiction of his court was invoked
by petitioners themselves, who sought an injunction establishing their control over
property of the American-Canadian Diocese of the church located in Lake County.
The jurisdiction of that court having been invoked for such a purpose by both
petitioners and respondents, contesting claimants to Diocesan authority, it was
entitled to ask if the real Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese would please
152
stand up.

Rehnquist used the strong language of “arbitrary lawlessness,” “blind
deference,” and “rubber-stamp” to condemn the hierarchical approach:
If the civil courts are to be bound by any sheet of parchment bearing the
ecclesiastical seal and purporting to be a decree of a church court, they can easily
be converted into handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness.
[. . . ]
Such blind deference, however, is counseled neither by logic nor by the First
Amendment. To make available the coercive powers of civil courts to rubberstamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical religious associations, when such
deference is not accorded similar acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in
avoiding the free exercise problems petitioners envision, itself create far more
153
serious problems under the Establishment Clause.

Since 1979, when the Supreme Court identified the “neutral principle of law”
approach to property disputes in Jones v. Wolf,154
courts must choose between deferring to a group’s hierarchy or using neutral
principles of law, that is, relying on documents that do not require choosing
between controverted interpretations of doctrines or practices. The basic stance is
one of noninvolvement: government may not resolve internal problems by criteria
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Serbian, 426 U.S. at 714-15.
Sirico, supra note 144, at 352.
Serbian, 426 U.S. at 725-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 727, 734.
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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that have a religious character. This basic stance reflects the limited competence
155
of secular courts, and it serves the autonomy of religious organizations.

Because the Supreme Court has not decided a religious property case since
1979, the state courts have been left to resolve the recent cases involving the
Episcopal churches around the country, where many local congregations seek to
leave the national diocese because of their disapproval of the national church’s
support for gay ordination.156
The cases have had different results. Eleven Virginia local church
congregations who split from the Episcopal Church won their lawsuit when a
Fairfax County judge ruled that Virginia law allowed them to depart from the
church with their property.157 The law is a Civil War-era law unique to Virginia; it
awards property ownership to the majority in the local church, even in a
hierarchical church.158 The Episcopal Diocese plans to appeal on First Amendment
grounds, arguing that the Virginia statute impinges on the freedom of churches to
govern themselves.159
In contrast, in California, the California Supreme Court found for the national
church using the neutral principles of law standard:
Although the deeds to the property have long been in the name of the local church,
that church agreed from the beginning of its existence to be part of the greater
church and to be bound by its governing documents. These governing documents
make clear that church property is held in trust for the general church and may be
controlled by the local church only so long as that local church remains a part of
the general church. When it disaffiliated from the general church, the local church
160
did not have the right to take the church property with it.

The court observed that in response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions, especially
Jones v. Wolf, the Episcopal Church adopted Canon I.7.4, which recites an express
trust in favor of the general church.161 The court rejected the local church’s
argument that it had never expressly ratified this canon,162 explaining that
“[r]equiring a particular method to change a church's constitution—such as
requiring every parish in the country to ratify the change—would infringe on the
free exercise rights of religious associations to govern themselves as they see fit. It
would impose a major, not a ‘minimal,’ burden on the church governance [in
violation of Jones v. Wolf].”163
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard agreed with the result
155. GREENAWALT, supra note 148, at 261-62.
156. Seceded Episcopalians Lose Calif. Land Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2009, at A05, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/05/AR2009010503142.html.
157. In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., No. CL 2007-0248724, 2008 Va. Cir. Lexis
161 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 19, 2008).
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9 (2007) (“How Property Rights Determined on Division of Church or
Society”).
159. Matthew Barakat, Conservatives Win Court Case in Virginia Church Dispute, ABCNews.com,
Dec. 19, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/us/wirestory?id=6497014.
160. Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 70-71 (Cal. 2009).
161. Id. at 72.
162. Id. at 80.
163. Id.
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but questioned the use of the neutral principles of law approach because “[n]o
principle of trust law exists that would allow the unilateral creation of a trust by the
declaration of a nonowner of property that the owner of the property is holding it in
trust for the nonowner.”164 Instead, she wrote, the polity approach allowed
judgment on behalf of the hierarchical national church.165
The breakaway local groups also lost in New York, which applied the neutral
principles of law approach in favor of the national church.166 The Court of Appeals
explained that in 1979—in response to Jones v. Wolf—the national church had
adopted the Dennis Canons, which state that the real and personal property of the
parishes is held in trust for the national church.167 Although the property deeds
were unclear about ownership, the court relied on the church’s constitution as
dispositive.168
Such reliance on church documents as the final word has troubled some
scholars, who have proposed that courts rely only on secular documents in making
their judgments about property divisions.169 Although this would force the
churches to prepare legal documents, it is a better alternative than automatically
letting the courts rubber-stamp whatever hierarchical churches desire.
Speaking of New York, its Religious Corporations Law includes separate
articles for Protestant Episcopal Parishes or Churches, Apostolic Episcopal
Parishes or Churches, the Holy Orthodox Church, the American Patriarchal
Orthodox Church, Presbyterian Churches, Roman Catholic Churches, Christian
Orthodox Catholic Churches of the Eastern Confession, Ruthenian Greek Catholic
Churches, Churches of the Orthodox Church in America, Reformed Dutch,
Reformed Presbyterian and Lutheran Churches, Baptist Churches, Churches of the
United Church of Christ, Congregational Christian and Independent Churches, the
Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of America, and many more, including the
Assemblies of God churches.170 Such state laws appear tolerant because they try to
allow different denominations to pick the legal structure that is most consistent
with its theology. They run the risk, however, of letting churches become a law
unto themselves and of undermining the common law enforcement necessary in the
tolerant rule of law.
A tolerant First Amendment embraces the words of Justice Rehnquist’s
Serbian dissent: “The rule . . . is that the government may not displace the free
religious choices of its citizens by placing its weight behind a particular religious
belief, tenet, or sect.”171 It does that when it protects institutions instead of
individuals, as it also does, not only in tort and property law, but also in
employment law.

164. Id. at 85 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
165. Id.
166. Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 899 N.E.2d 920, 923-25 (N.Y. 2008).
167. Id. at 922-23.
168. Id. at 924-25.
169. See generally Sirico, supra note 144.
170. See NY CLS Relig. Corp. §§ 1-455 (2009), available at http://law.justia.com/ newyork/
codes/religious-corporations.
171. 426 U.S. at 733 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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3. Employment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of religion, race, color, sex, or national origin, contains an exemption for
religious organizations from lawsuits for religious discrimination.172 The common
sense of the exception is that Baptists may favor Baptists in their hiring just as
Democratic groups favor Democrats and Planned Parenthood’s members are prochoice. Congress considered but did not pass legislation that barred religious
organizations from all lawsuits; therefore religious organizations can be sued for
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin. “Employment
discrimination unconnected to religious belief, religious doctrine, or the internal
regulations of a church is simply the exercise of intolerance, not the free exercise of
religion that the Constitution protects.”173
Because Title VII technically would allow women to sue churches that do not
ordain women for sex discrimination, the courts have read a “ministerial exception”
into the statute.174 The exception is supposed to serve the valid tolerant goals of
keeping the state from interpreting religious dogma, intruding on church autonomy,
and imposing clergy on the churches.175 In practice, however, the ministerial
exception has extended far beyond that point and become a grant of immunity
blocking lawsuits against churches and allowing them to become a law unto
themselves.176 Despite the name of the exception, the cases have not been limited
to ministers and priests. Female or gay high school teachers, secretaries, university
professors, organists, and choir directors, among others, have had their
discrimination lawsuits dismissed because of the churches’ religious freedom to
hire as they wish without court interference.177 In other words, antidiscrimination
law is not the same for religious as it is for secular organizations.
Consider the case of Lynette Petruska, who became the first female chaplain in
Roman Catholic Gannon University’s history.178 Because of that all-male history,
at the time of her appointment, Petruska asked if she would be replaced as soon as
a male priest returned from Rome or another male candidate became available.179

172. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-1 (2003). The religious exemption is
usually referred to as Section 702, and was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
173. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 448 F.3d 615, 620, No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at
*2 (3d Cir. 2006) (withdrawn on grant of rehearing June 20, 2006).
174. See Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Court Access to
Ministerial Employees, 74 IND. L.J. 269, 269 (1998) (citing cases from the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits).
175. Id. at 269.
176. See id. at 281 (“For example, instead of allowing an individual to ‘become law unto himself,’
the ministerial exception allows a church to become a law unto itself . . . . Thus, in allowing a church to
escape scrutiny for possible discriminatory actions, courts give religious organizations free reign to
discriminate for any reason.”).
177. These cases are collected in LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION: CASES AND MATERIALS
274-81 (2007); SUPPLEMENT (2009). See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.
1972); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d
1036 (7th Cir. 2006).
178. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2006).
179. Id.
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She was assured that the job was hers to keep.180 Then the university president
faced charges of sexual harassment, and Petruska served on the Sexual Harassment
committee.181 As the controversy unfolded, Petruska alleged that “she opposed
limiting the time frame during which a Gannon employee could file a sexual
harassment grievance with the university; helped prepare a report criticizing the
university’s sexual harassment policies; played a pivotal role in notifying [the
provost and bishop that the president] had sexually harassed a Gannon employee
for several years; and opposed [the bishop’s] decision to allow a former Gannon
priest, who had been terminated for sexual misconduct toward students, to enter the
university’s campus.”182
In the second Third Circuit opinion about Petruska’s lawsuit, Judge Smith
dismissed the Title VII lawsuit for gender discrimination and retaliation using a
simple but misguided argument that, because the ministerial exception protects “a
religious institution’s right to select who will perform particular spiritual
functions,” Petruska’s lawsuit should be dimissed.183 That analysis missed the
point, as was shown by the first Third Circuit opinion, written by Judge Becker
with Smith in dissent, which was withdrawn because Judge Becker died as the
opinion was circulating.184 Although a religious organization might fire someone
for genuinely religious reasons (because she did not hold the proper faith or
perform the ritual correctly), Judge Becker insisted that “a religious institution
might also fire a woman because the individuals making the decision are, simply
put, sexist. Religious doctrine and internal church regulation play no role in such a
decision.”185 According to Judge Becker, the facts of Petruska’s case involved the
latter situation. Title VII prohibits such sex discrimination, and to give churches
immunity for such suits protects churches at the expense of the civil rights of
individuals.
Gannon University believed that women could be chaplains. It offered no
religious rationale for firing Petruska. Nonetheless, her Title VII claim was
dismissed. As Judge Becker wrote, “Employment discrimination unconnected to
religious belief, religious doctrine, or the internal regulations of a church is simply
the exercise of intolerance, not the free exercise of religion that the Constitution
protects.”186 The churches’ exercise of intolerance is then magnified when courts
protect churches’ power instead of individuals’ constitutional rights and exempt
churches from the laws that govern everyone else. A tolerant First Amendment
must protect individuals against churches as well as against the lethal combination
of church and state.
Recent ministerial exception cases confirm that Petruska’s case is not unique.
Although churches are not exempt from racial discrimination under the statutory
language of Title VII, courts continue to dismiss racial discrimination cases without

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 300 n.2.
Petruska, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *50 n.40.
Petruska, 462 F.3d at 307.
Petruska, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *57-78.
Id at *21-22.
Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
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even looking at the facts.187 In one case, a Methodist minister alleged racial
discrimination against his superintendent as well as retaliation—blocking him from
getting a new job—because he had complained about racial discrimination. The
court barred both claims.188
Age discrimination claims by teachers in religious schools are repeatedly
dismissed although considerations of age bear no relationship to religious
doctrine.189 Such rulings “effectively extend[] a free pass to religious schools to
discriminate against their lay employees.”190 The free pass extends to disability
rights as well. Cheryl Perich taught kindergarten for five years at Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran School until she became “suddenly ill” and went on disability
leave until her doctors diagnosed narcolepsy.191 Although Perich provided a
doctor’s certification of her readiness to return to work, the school board repeatedly
asked her to resign.192 When she challenged the denial of a teaching position, she
was fired for her “insubordination and disruptive behavior.”193 The school board
also observed that Perich’s threats of a disability lawsuit “damaged beyond repair”
her working relationship with Hosanna-Tabor.194 Although the church made no
claim that there were religious reasons to refuse to hire teachers suffering from
narcolepsy, both her Americans with Disabilities Act and retaliation claims were
dismissed.195 The ministerial exception placed the church above the law at the
expense of church members.
The success of religious plaintiffs’ employment claims is not guaranteed; like
all employment discrimination plaintiffs, they should bear the burden of proof. In
contrast, the ministerial exception allows cases to be dismissed without any
consideration of the facts or without any specific evidence that the religious
employer’s free exercise was implicated in the employment decision. Gannon
University did not have a doctrine of sexual harassment, nor did Hosanna-Tabor
espouse a religion of disability discrimination. Nonetheless, the courts protected
their freedom to discriminate for no religious reason. As Judge Becker wrote,
“Employment discrimination unconnected to religious belief, religious doctrine, or
the internal regulations of a church is simply the exercise of intolerance, not the
free exercise of religion that the Constitution protects.”196 As the Framers knew,
individuals need to be protected from the powers of the church.
These three examples from tort, property, and antidiscrimination law illustrate
the problems with a vision of religious freedom that neglects it roots in toleration.
187. McCants v. Ala.-W. Fla. Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., No. 08-0686-KD-C,
2009 WL 1537868, Slip Op. at *1, *6 (S.D.Ala. June 1, 2009).
188. Id.
189. See Coulee Catholic Schs. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868 (Wis. 2009);
Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, No. 09-1950, 2009 WL 1668550
(Mass. Super. June 2, 2009).
190. Coulee Catholic Schs., 768 N.W.2d at 893 (Crooks, J., dissenting).
191. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n. v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 883 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
192. Id. at 885.
193. Id. at 885-86.
194. Id. at 885.
195. Id. at 892.
196. Petruska, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *2.
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The Framers drafted the First Amendment in order to protect a constitutional right
to religious freedom and to protect individuals from the powers of church and state.
Instead, the Free Exercise Clause has been transformed into a standard that protects
religious organizations from complying with the laws at the expense of their
members. Recognizing the dangers of religious wars among churches that seek to
impose their own truth, tolerance establishes a system of the same law for
everyone. Instead, the courts have offered religious organizations special
protections from the law’s application.
That problem is exacerbated when government funding helps religious
organizations to attain their goals at the expense of individual freedom, as
described in Part IV-B.
B. GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF RELIGION
Q. Mr. Lyons, what did IFI teach as to what you needed to do to get off drugs and
stay off drugs?
A. Drug addiction was recognized as a sin. And all we had to do was seek—
confess that sin, repent of that sin, and just start doing things differently from that
point forward.
Q. And what did IFI teach the cure for substance abuse problem was?
A. Well, I would say it was—again, if you’ve confessed your sin and you have—
you were forgiven, then you were no longer bound by that sin, so therefore you
could go ahead and move on. You were freed from that addiction. You were
197
released from that addiction.

IFI is the InnerChange Freedom Initiative, a Christian prison ministry founded
by Watergate convict Charles Colson, which teaches that prisoners’ lives can be
healed by becoming Christian: “If these felons never want to wind up behind bars
again, they are told, they must accept the ‘life-transforming power of Jesus
Christ.’”198 In this “Bible boot camp,” prisoners spend sixteen-hour days in
classes, in an environment of prayer, Bible reading, and hymn singing, all with the
goal of that “inner change” that gives the program its name.199
The questions and answers quoted above were testimony in a lawsuit against
the Iowa Department of Corrections, which sponsored an InnerChange program in
its state prisons. Other prisoners’ comments about the program are equally
illuminating. One Catholic prisoner used his own Catholic Bible for the Bible
workshop but found out that it did not provide him with the “correct” answers.
When he told Bruce, the IFI staff member, that he wanted to use the program to
learn more about Catholicism, the IFI staff member revealed Bruce saying “that’s
not what they was going to be teaching, and their program consisted of a sevenday, 24-hour a day type religion, still not letting me know exactly what kind of
religion they was going to be teaching, but was letting me know, basically, mine

197. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PRISON RELIGION: FAITH-BASED REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 48 (2009).
198. Hanna Rosin & Terry M. Neal, Converting Convicts to Christians; Texas Blesses Use of Strict
‘Christ-Centered’ Agenda at Small Prison, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1999, at A01.
199. Jonathan Aitken, Stop Punishing Criminals, It Doesn't Work, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Apr.
25, 2004, at News Review 9.
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was taking a second seat to what they was going to teach.”200
A federal district court ruled that the state sponsorship of the program violated
the Establishment Clause.201 The prison experience illustrates the numerous
constitutional questions about the increased government support for faith-based
organizations [FBOs] that began during the Clinton administration, grew during
George W. Bush’s presidency, and is now backed by President Obama.202
Although the government aid programs claim to support equality, neutrality, and
free exercise, many of the programs are not tolerant.203 A tolerant First
Amendment insists that the government may not fund religious practice or foster
discrimination against individuals. Unfortunately, even under President Obama,
the federal government has not yet made the commitment to such tolerance for all
religions.
Debates about government aid to religion are as old as the nation. When the
citizens of the fledgling American republic worried that public morality was
declining in colonial Virginia, they proposed an assessments bill to fund
churches.204 A tax to fund teachers of religion would be imposed on every citizen,
each of whom would then choose which Christian denomination should receive the
money.205 A list of the citizens’ churches of choice would be maintained in the
courthouse.206 The churches could choose to spend the money either on building
places of worship or paying ministers’ salaries.207 An exception was made for the
Quakers and the Mennonites, who had neither buildings nor clergy, and were
therefore allowed to use their money as they saw fit.208 Money from taxpayers who
did not belong to a church would go to the local schools.209
A prominent opponent of the legislation wrote the following words of
criticism:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which
can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of
any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all
210
cases whatsoever?

200. SULLIVAN, supra note 197, at 34-35 (italics in original).
201. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d
862, 940-41 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
202. Amy Sullivan, Obama Tries to Renew Faith in a Faith-Based Office, TIME, Feb. 5, 2009,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1877283,00.html.
203. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
204. A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (Va. Dec. 24, 1784)
available at http://candst.tripod.com/assessb.htm. (the bill never reached the House floor).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. For background on the Memorial and Remonstrance, see THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, S.J., CHURCH
AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 1776-1787 (1977); Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and
Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
783 (2002).
210. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, ¶ 3, available at
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Those are the famous words of James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, which was written in 1784 in opposition to Patrick
Henry’s Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion.211
Madison, with the help of Virginia’s Baptists and other dissenters, won the
argument, and instead of the assessments bill, the State of Virginia passed Thomas
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which stated that no one could
be compelled to “support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.”212
Memorial and Remonstrance provided numerous arguments against Henry’s
bill, including one that mentions intolerance and draws an analogy between the bill
and the Spanish Inquisition.213 According to Madison:
the legislation degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions
in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority. Distant as it may be
in its present form from the Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one
is the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance. The magnanimous
sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions, must view the Bill as a
Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek some other haven, where liberty and
philanthrophy in their due extent, may offer a more certain repose from his
214
Troubles.

Memorial and Remonstrance reminds us that the status of government funding
of religious organizations has been a vexing problem since the nation’s origins.
The Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion
demonstrates that sometimes the government is tempted to promote morality by
supporting religion. The Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom215
suggests there is a venerable American tradition of believing that the liberty of the
individual conscience is best protected when individuals are not compelled to
support religion and may freely choose their own worship.
In the 20th century, many religious groups argued that the rise of the welfare
state, where the government funds everything, requires a different perspective on
funding religion than that taken by Madison.216 They believe free exercise, equal
protection, and neutrality require the funding of religion. That argument is
overstated. A tolerant First Amendment does not allow the government to fund
religious teaching, which is the goal of programs like InnerChange. Tolerance sees
through the free exercise argument that churches have a right to public funding as
well as the equal protection and neutrality arguments that churches must receive
equal funding to other social services providers. Instead, the history of tolerance
teaches that church and state must not join forces to influence individual liberty of
conscience by, for example, proposing the Bible as a cure to alcohol addiction.
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html.
211. Id.
212. BUCKLEY, supra note 209, at 190-91.
213. Madison, supra note 210, at ¶ 9.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/
library/index.asp?document=23. The bill was enacted in Virginia in 1786. See MICHAEL W.
MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 69-70 (2002).
216. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 161
(1992).
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Providing government aid to institutions that are allowed to discriminate in
hiring,217 moreover, is not tolerant. Just as the Wars of Religion taught that
religious truth should not be the basis of the laws, so too the government should
never fund religious truth; a tolerant First Amendment allows religions to pursue
the truth without government funding and supports the non-religious programs that
they offer under the same conditions as secular providers.
Religion-based social services organizations like Catholic Charities, Lutheran
Social Services, the Salvation Army, and the Jewish Federation have received
government funding for many years.218 In 1996, for example, Catholic Charities,
the largest such organization, received $1.3 billion in government aid.219 These
groups, however, are the separately-incorporated, secular affiliates of the churches
and synagogues. Catholic Charities, for example, is a separate legal entity from its
sponsor, the Roman Catholic Church.220 The provision of government aid to the
secular affiliates, and not to the churches themselves, was consistent with the
Supreme Court’s long tradition of church-state no-aid separation, which did not
allow the states to fund religious practices or “pervasively sectarian” institutions.221
In August 1996, Congress passed welfare reform legislation that included a
“charitable choice” amendment introduced by Missouri Senator John Ashcroft.222
Ashcroft, the son of a Pentecostal minister, was influenced by Marvin Olasky’s
writings about the success of religious groups in solving social ills.223 Although the
primary focus of the welfare legislation was on state involvement and the
privatization of welfare, Senator Ashcroft quietly and successfully included the
charitable choice amendment, whose purpose was to make the states’ contracts
available to religious organizations without any compromise of their religious
identity.224
Then-Texas Governor George W. Bush, who successfully stopped drinking
after he was born again to Christian faith, was ahead of the federal Charitable
Choice movement; three months earlier, he had founded an FBO task force. Bush

217. See infra notes 235-47 and accompanying text.
218. See Stanley Carlson-Thies, Faith-Based Institutions Cooperating With Public Welfare: The
Promise of the Charitable Choice Provision, in WELFARE REFORM AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
29, 36 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins, eds., 1999). See also STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND
SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY (1996); Sharon Daly,
Common Sense and the Common Good: Helping the Poor and Protecting Religious Liberty, in
WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 139 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins, eds., 1999).
219. Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 33, 36
(2000).
220. See generally Catholic Charities U.S.A., http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/NetCommunity/
Page.aspx?pid=1408 (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
221. Contrast Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) and Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 590
(1988) with Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000).
222. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 [PRWORA], 42
U.S.C. § 604a (2003).
223. LEWIS D. SOLOMON, IN GOD WE TRUST?: FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS AND THE QUEST TO
SOLVE AMERICA’S SOCIAL ILLS 134 (2003).
224. Michele Estrin Gilman, “Charitable Choice” and the Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the
Need for Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REV. 799, 807 (2002).
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was also one of the first governors to welcome InnerChange to state prisons.225
Like Governor Bush and other advocates of FBOs, Senator Ashcroft believed that
directing government aid to secular affiliates undermined the churches’ religious
identity and discriminated against churches that did not want to create the separate
organizations.226 Ashcroft’s goal was to get the money to the churches themselves
without compromise of religious identity.227
The argument and the Charitable Choice amendment’s language came from
University of Missouri Professor Carl Esbeck, whose research made two
substantive points that are important for understanding President Bush’s faithbased reforms. First, Esbeck believed that faith-based organizations should be able
to receive funding without employing the secular affiliate status employed by many
religious social agencies, i.e., by keeping their religious identities without any
dilution.228 Second, Esbeck argued that the old system discriminated against
religious in favor of secular providers, especially by requiring religions to
secularize in order to receive aid.229 Accordingly, the legislation allowed churches
to receive contracts, vouchers or other forms of funding:
[O]n the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without impairing the
religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing the religious
230
freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded under such program.

Government funds could not be used for “sectarian worship, instruction, or
proselytization.”231 Religious providers did not have to remove religious art and
symbols from their buildings or dismiss religious personnel from their governing
boards.232 The religious groups retained their exemption from civil rights statutes
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion in hiring,233 but were forbidden
to discriminate against aid recipients on the basis of religion.234 Secular
alternatives had to be available to the recipients, although the law did not require
notification to beneficiaries of those alternatives.235 Finally, the religious groups
were allowed to keep the contract money in a separate account so that the rest of
their finances would not be audited.236
As noted above, in 1996 the primary focus of government officials was on
welfare reform and not charitable choice, and President Clinton’s administration
did little to implement the legislation. Indeed, one important book on FBO
suggests that some Democrats voted for the amendment because they were sure
225. Texas Freedom Network, Faith Based Initiative Timeline, http://www.tfn.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=txtimeline (last visited Sept. 11, 2009)
226. Gilman, supra note 224, at 807-08.
227. Id.
228. Carl H. Esbeck, Charitable Choice and the Critics, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 17, 19 (2000)
(discussing a “safeguard” for the “religious character” of faith-based organizations as the main purpose
of charitable choice).
229. Id. at 18.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2003).
231. Id. at § 604a(j).
232. Id. at § 604a(d).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2003).
234. Id. at § 604a(g).
235. Id. at § 604a(e).
236. Id. at § 604a(h)(2).
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Clinton would never enforce it.237 President Bush was a different story. He
sponsored FBO legislation from his first days in the White House.238 After the
failure of all his proposed congressional FBO bills, George Bush enacted his entire
FBO policy by executive order.239
Bush’s FBO legislation failed because it included provisions allowing religious
employers to hire and fire employees based on religious beliefs.240 House
Democrats, led by Representatives Bobby Scott of Virginia and Chet Edwards of
Texas, focused on this issue of employment discrimination and rallied opposition to
expanded charitable choice on that basis.241 As we learned in Part IV-A(2), Title
VII, the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s, which prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, contains
an exemption for religious organizations from the ban on religious
discrimination.242 That exemption makes a certain intuitive sense; it permits
Baptist organizations to hire Baptists, Catholic groups to hire Catholics, and so
forth, just as environmental groups employ pro-environmental workers and Planned
Parenthood’s counselors are pro-choice.243 The religious hiring point is usually
made most forcefully about the ministry: surely, the argument goes, the Catholic
Church may “discriminate” by hiring Catholics, and only Catholics, to be priests,
and Baptist ministers must be Baptist.244
Many churches refuse to hire women and gays even though Title VII prohibits
gender discrimination and some state and local antidiscrimination laws protect
sexual orientation. As a technical matter of statutory interpretation, those churches
should be subject to suit for gender and sexual orientation discrimination in these
circumstances because their exemption is for religious discrimination only. But, as
we saw in Part IV, the ministerial exception keeps the cases from getting into
237. AMY E. BLACK, DOUGLAS L. KOOPMAN & DAVID K. RYDEN, OF LITTLE FAITH: THE POLITICS
(2004).
238. Hanna Skandera, Bush’s Armies of Compassion Are Inching Forward, HOOVER INST.,
STANFORD U., May 26, 2003, available at http://www.hoover.org/pubaffairs/dailyreport/archive/
2849036.html.
239. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002); Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2002);
Exec. Order No. 13,280, 3 C.F.R. 262 (2003); Exec. Order No. 13,342, 3 C.F.R. 180 (2005); Exec.
Order No. 13,397, 3 C.F.R. 216 (2007), possibly overruled by new Obama Orders, see
www.whitehouse.gov. See Carrie Johnson, Obama Cautious on Faith-Based Initiatives; Activists Cite
Campaign Pledge, but President Is Slow to Break With Bush Policies, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2009, at
A06.
240. DAVID KUO, TEMPTING FAITH: AN INSIDE STORY OF POLITICAL SEDUCTION 163 (2006).
241. See Melissa Rogers, Federal Funding and Religion-Based Employment Decisions, in
SANCTIONING RELIGION? POLITICS, LAW AND FAITH-BASED PUBLIC SERVICES 105, 108 (David K.
Ryden & Jeffrey Polet, eds., 2005); CARL H. ESBECK, STANLEY W. CARLSON-THIES & RONALD J.
SIDER, THE FREEDOM OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS TO STAFF ON A RELIGIOUS BASIS (2004);
Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1 (2002).
242. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-2 (2003). The religious exemption is usually referred to as Section
702, and was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103, 104 (1972).
243. See Jeffrey Rosen, Religious Rights: Why the Catholic Church Shouldn’t Have to Hire Gays,
NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at 16.
244. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964). See also Green, supra
note 219, at 3; Rogers, supra note 241, at 108.
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court.245 In other words, antidiscrimination law is not the same for religious as it is
for secular organizations.
Concerns about discrimination thwarted Bush’s FBO legislation in Congress.
The exemption of religious employers from religious discrimination laws sounds
straightforward and reasonable at first glance, as rabbis should be Jewish, imams
Muslim, and so forth. Allowing churches to hire their own ministers is part of the
appropriate church autonomy recognized in Part IV-A.
The FBO context, however, raises a different set of issues. Jewish taxpayers’
money, for example, might go to organizations that refuse to hire Jews, wish to
convert Jews, or whose theology casts Jews as the murderers of Jesus Christ.246
Churches that disapprove of homosexuality or women’s equality could fire gay
workers or refuse to hire “unmarried pregnant women,”247 while receiving
government funds. In 2001 and 2002, the Democrats hammered away at the
discrimination theme, insisting that the Republican House bill gave federal funds to
groups that violated the antidiscrimination laws. Their point was reinforced in July
2001, when the Washington Post broke a story that the Salvation Army had
promised to support the FBO initiative in return for a pledge from Bush political
adviser Karl Rove that the organization would be exempt from state and local
antidiscrimination laws, specifically any laws requiring the organization, which
opposes gay rights, to be subject to domestic partnership laws.248
Thus, in the funding of FBOs reappear the intolerance issues of Part III, where
religious groups used Proposition 8 to enact their religious opposition to
homosexuality into law and now wish to use government funds to support that
intolerance.249 In the FBO context, such tolerance becomes intolerant as religious
groups expect taxpayers’ money to fund their religious truth.
Senator Obama seemed to understand this point during the presidential
campaign. “Obama clearly singled out the policy during a campaign speech in
July, declaring that ‘if you get a federal grant, you can’t use that grant money to
proselytize to the people you help and you can’t discriminate against them—or
against the people you hire—on the basis of their religion.’”250 When President
Obama announced the opening of his White House Office of Faith-based and

245. Green, supra note 219, at 108.
246. For an explanation of why many Jewish Americans feel protected by a no-aid-to-religion policy,
see Gregg Ivers, American Jews and the Equal Treatment Principle, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF
RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 158 (Steven V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper, eds., 1998). See
also Thomas B. Edsall, Jewish Leaders Criticize “Faith-Based” Initiative, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2001,
at A04; David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best
Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (2003).
247. See Rosen, supra note 243, at 17 (arguing that it would be permissible to fire nonmarried
pregnant woman).
248. Mike Allen & Dana Milbank, Rove Heard Charity Plea on Gay Bias, WASH. POST, July 12,
2001, at A01; BLACK ET AL., supra note 237, at 210; Dana Milbank, Story of Charity Plea Changes
Again, WASH. POST, July 13, 2001, at A02; Hanna Rosin, Charity’s Image Shaken by Gay Bias Flap,
WASH. POST, July 15, 2001, at A05. Although later reports challenged the accuracy of the stories, see
BLACK ET AL., supra note 237, at 213, the political damage was done.
249. See supra Part III.
250. Peter Wallsten & Duke Helfand, Obama Upholds Bush Faith Policy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/06/nation/na-obama-faith6.
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Neighborhood Partnerships, however, he left the Bush hiring policies in place.251
Robert Scott, the Virginia representative who had blocked Bush’s FBO legislation
because it allowed for discrimination in hiring, stated, “‘Based on what he said, we
thought the issue had been resolved, . . . You’ll have to ask them why they think it's
all right to discriminate.’ . . . [T]he issue carried ‘racial implications’ because
‘most churches are either 100% white or 100% black. . . . If you allow religious
discrimination, then racial discrimination is essentially unenforceable[.]’”252
Meanwhile, religious leaders were happy with Obama’s decision.
As the prison testimony suggests, discrimination in hiring is not the only
difficult issue surrounding government aid to FBOs. If religious programs believe
that faith solves social problems like alcoholism or drug addiction, then the
government is funding faith whenever it aids those providers, a combination of
church and state that promotes intolerance and undermines individual religious
liberty. When the government promotes the Protestant Bible over the Catholic
Bible in state prisons, it has forgotten the tolerant roots of the First Amendment.
Empirical studies about FBOs demonstrate that government funding is less likely to
wind up in the pockets of smaller religious groups—a reminder of the last point
about tolerance, that it is more equipped to welcome new religions and
philosophies to the American climate than current free exercise and establishment
jurisprudence.
V. TOLERANCE ACCEPTS THE NEW DIVERSITY
The Summum religion is based on seven principles: psychokinesis,
correspondence, vibration, opposition, rhythm, cause and effect, and gender.253
Summum, which was founded in Utah in 1975 and describes itself as a form of
Gnostic Christianity, teaches that God originally gave Moses the Seven
Aphorisms.254 After the Israelites were unprepared to receive the aphorisms,
however, Moses destroyed those first tablets and later replaced them with a second
set of tablets containing the simpler Ten Commandments.255 The Supreme Court
recently refused Summum’s request to place a Seven Aphorisms monument in a
Utah park that already contained a Ten Commandments display.256 The result
reflects the current intolerance of the Court’s public displays jurisprudence toward
minority religions.
To date, the Supreme Court’s intolerant First Amendment jurisprudence has
allowed Christian monuments—crosses and Ten Commandments—to remain in
251. Press Release, National Association of Evangelicals, NAE Welcomes President Obama’s
Commitment to Faith-Based Initiative (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.nae.net/index.cfm
(follow hyperlink for “News & Events,” then follow hyperlink to the article).
252. Wallsten & Helfand, supra note 250.
253. Seven Summum Principles, http://summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited October
2, 2009).
254. About Summum, http://summum.org/about.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2009); Summum and
Freemasonry, http://summum.us/philosophy/freemasonry.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2009); The
Teachings of the Summum Are the Teachings of Gnostic Christianity, http://summum.us/ philosophy/
gnosticism.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2009).
255. Summum and Freemasonry, supra note 254.
256. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138.
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public settings while requests for equal space by minority religions like Summum
and Buddhism are denied. This result is intolerant because the state’s power is
used to enforce and favor one religious truth—Protestant Christianity—over
others.257 A tolerant First Amendment imposes two requirements that the Court
has ignored: first, it recognizes that crosses and the Ten Commandments retain
their religious character and are not secular; second, it allows such religious
displays to stand only if they are surrounded by other religious monuments and
symbols, such as, the Summum Aphorisms, the Buddhist stupa, the Jewish Star of
David, the Muslim crescent and star, or the Wiccan pentacle.
Instead, the Court has employed a “tyranny of labels”258—free speech, public
forum, nonpublic forum, government and private speech, establishment—to rule
against the minority religions, and in doing so has neglected the tolerant core of the
First Amendment. This intolerance is most evident in the four most recent
Supreme Court cases about displays, not only Summum, but also the two Ten
Commandments cases, as well as a California case, recently granted certiorari,
about a Latin cross and a Buddhist shrine or stupa.259
Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah, contains a Ten Commandments
monument donated to the city in 1971 by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.260
Summum offered a Seven Aphorisms monument to the park, but the city rejected it
on the grounds that, unlike the other monuments in the park, Summum’s display
either did not relate to the history of Pleasant Grove or was not donated by a group
with “long-standing ties” to the city that had made “valuable civic contributions to
our city for many years”261—presumably a reference to the Eagles. Summum
reasonably challenged those two post hoc justifications for the denial because the
Ten Commandments monument was quite distinctive compared to the other Utahbased monuments in the park:
• Old Bell School (oldest known school building in Utah)
• First City Hall (original Pleasant Grove Town Hall)
• Pioneer Winter Corral (historic winter sheepfold)
• First Fire Station (facade of city’s first fire station with plaque)
• Nauvoo Temple Stone (artifact from Mormon Temple in Nauvoo, Illinois)
• Pioneer Log Cabin (replica, built in 1930)
• Pioneer Water Well (donated by Lions Club in 1946)
• Pioneer Granary (built in 1874, donated by Nelson family)
• Ten Commandments Monument (donated by Fraternal Order of Eagles in
1971)
• September 11 Monument (project of local Boy Scouts)
• Pioneer Flour Mill Stone (used in first flour mill in town, donated by Joe

257. All the Ten Commandments cases that have gone to the Supreme Court involved the King
James version of the Commandments.
258. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138
(2009) (No. 07-665) (a reference made by Justice Kennedy).
259. Buono, 527 F.3d 758.
260. Joint Appendix at 15, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009) (No. 07665).
261. Id. at 61.
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Davis).262
Summum challenged the denial on First Amendment speech grounds.
Following the terminology of free speech jurisprudence, the district court originally
ruled for the city because the park was a nonpublic forum in which the government
could control the content of its own message.263 The Tenth Circuit, however, ruled
for Summum on the grounds that the park was a traditional public forum that the
government had opened to private speakers, where the government may not
discriminate on the basis of the monument’s content.264 In the U.S. Supreme
Court, the parties debated whether the monuments in the park were government or
private speech.265 If the former, the government has the freedom under First
Amendment law to control its own message. If the latter, the government is not
permitted to discriminate when it opens a forum for private speakers.
With the focus on speech, not religion, the city’s lawyers identified the drastic
implications of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Summum that the park was a public
forum: “If the authorities place a statue of Ulysses S. Grant in the park, the First
Amendment does not require them also to install a statue of Robert E. Lee.”266 “In
short, accepting a Statue of Liberty does not compel a government to accept a
Statue of Tyranny.”267 Judge Michael McConnell, who dissented from the Tenth
Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, lamented:
This means that Central Park in New York, which contains the privately donated
Alice in Wonderland statue, must now allow other persons to erect Summum’s
“Seven Aphorisms,” or whatever else they choose (short of offending a policy that
narrowly serves a “compelling” governmental interest). Every park in the country
that has accepted a VFW memorial is now a public forum for the erection of
permanent fixed monuments; they must either remove the war memorials or brace
themselves for an influx of clutter. . . . A city that accepted the donation of a statue
honoring a local hero could be forced, under the panel’s rulings, to allow a local
religious society to erect a Ten Commandments monument—or for that matter, a
268
cross, a nativity scene, a statue of Zeus, or a Confederate flag.

Despite its religious facts and the case’s implications for establishment and
free exercise, Summum was not litigated under the Religion Clauses. At the oral
argument, even the Supreme Court justices appeared confused that the case was
about free speech, not religion; Justice Anthony Kennedy derided the “tyranny of
labels” that left the Court speaking about nonpublic and public fora, government
and private speech,269 and the Chief Justice warned the city that “the more you say
that the monument is Government speech to get out of the first, free speech—the

262. Id. at 98-102.
263. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1050 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing the district
court’s oral ruling and the standard the district court used in its analysis).
264. Id. at 1050-52.
265. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138.
266. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1125
(citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
267. Brief for the Petitioner at *2, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 2008 WL 2445506 (No. 07065).
268. Summum, 499 F.3d at 1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
269. Transcript of Oral Arguments, supra note 258, at 35-37.
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Free Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you’re walking into a trap under the
Establishment Clause.”270
When the Court issued its unanimous ruling for the city, however, the labeling
was straightforward; Justice Samuel Alito concluded “although a park is a
traditional public forum for speeches and other transitory expressive acts, the
display of a permanent monument in a public park is not a form of expression to
which forum analysis applies.”271 In other words, the government cannot ban
Summum’s members from reading the Seven Aphorisms aloud in the park while
allowing other private speakers to read the Ten Commandments, but the
government may choose one monument over another because the government
speaks through the monument.
Although the Court’s ruling appears practical and unsurprising—would the
justices dare authorize the Statues of Tyranny and Zeus?—in effect the Court
protected the Protestant Ten Commandments at the expense of other religions.
Earlier precedents did not help Summum; the Supreme Court’s and Tenth Circuit’s
case law made it nearly impossible to litigate Summum’s challenge on religious
grounds. The Court has decided numerous cases allowing public religious displays
containing crèches, menorahs, and the Ten Commandments. In Lynch v.
Donnelly,272 Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote that the public display of a crèche
in a holiday display that also included “a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling
Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures
representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of
colored lights, [and] a large banner that reads ‘SEASONS GREETINGS’” did not
violate the Establishment Clause.273 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence introduced
her influential endorsement test, which asked whether a reasonable observer would
believe the government endorsed religion in the display.274 Endorsement “sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.”275
In a later crèche case,276 Justice O’Connor concurred in a decision that a
Christian Nativity scene on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County
Courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, but an eighteen-foot Chanukah
menorah or candelabrum, located outside the City-County Building and next to the
city’s 45-foot decorated Christmas tree and a “salute to liberty” sign, did not.277
O’Connor again relied upon the endorsement standard, concluding that the crèche
conveyed a message of exclusion to non-Christians, while the combined display of
menorah and Christmas tree did not send a message of endorsement of Judaism or
Christianity.278 O’Connor’s solution, which was widely criticized, suggested that
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 4.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 671-72.
Id. at 687-94.
Id. at 688.
County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Id. at 623-37.
Id. at 637.
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the best way to cure a possible Establishment Clause problem is to surround
authentically religious symbols with as many secular symbols as possible,
including teddy bears, clowns, and elephants.279
In Lynch, the dissenting Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens)
correctly and tolerantly objected to the majority’s depiction of the nativity scene as
a secular, holiday symbol, insisting on the “clear religious import of the crèche”
and “its inherent religious significance.”280 Tolerance recognizes religion as
religion and does not attempt to secularize it. This religious–secular distinction had
legal significance in Tenth Circuit history as well; in 1973 the Court ruled in
Anderson v. Salt Lake City that a Ten Commandments monument at a county
courthouse was secular, not religious.281 That precedent kept Summum’s potential
claim of religious discrimination from being litigated; if the commandments were
secular, the Utah cities could not violate the Establishment Clause by allowing the
Ten Commandments but not the Seven Aphorisms. In subsequent litigation against
the City of Ogden, Utah, Summum conceded in 2002 that it could not win an
Establishment Clause challenge to another Ten Commandments display without an
en banc reconsideration of Anderson, and it placed its hopes on free speech.282
Then in 2005 the Supreme Court decided two conflicting Ten Commandments
cases. In McCreary County v. ACLU, Justice David Souter’s opinion invalidated a
display of the commandments in a Kentucky county courthouse because it lacked a
secular purpose.283 In contrast, in Van Orden v. Perry,284 Chief Justice William
Rehnquist wrote that “the nature of the monument and [] our Nation’s history”
allow Texas to display a Ten Commandments monument on state capitol grounds
in a park that also includes”:
Heroes of the Alamo, Hood’s Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Fireman,
Terry’s Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy, Spanish-American War, Texas National
Guard, Ten Commandments, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer
Woman, The Boy Scouts’ Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans,
Korean War Veterans, Soldiers of World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas
285
Peace Officers.

Justice Antonin Scalia pushed further, arguing that the First Amendment
allows the government to prefer monotheism and to erect such monuments, and
noting with approval that 97.7 percent of the population believes in the Ten
Commandments.286 Justice John Paul Stevens sparred with Justice Scalia over the
nature of the commandments, trying to teach him “[t]here are many distinctive
versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different
279. Id. at 633, 635.
280. Id. at 705-06.
281. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 34 (10th Cir. 1973).
282. Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d
995 (10th Cir. 2002).
283. 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005).
284. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
285. Id. at 686, 681 n.1.
286. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 886-87, 893-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This statistic is called
into question by recent surveys of American religion. See American Religious Identification Survey
2008, http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org.
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denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these
differences may be of enormous religious significance. . . . In choosing to display
this version of the Commandments, Texas tells the observer that the State supports
this side of the doctrinal religious debate.”287 Scalia intolerantly rejected Stevens’s
reasoning with the rejoinder: “The sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not
widely known. I doubt that most religious adherents are even aware that there are
competing versions with doctrinal consequences (I certainly was not). In any
event, the context of the display here could not conceivably cause the viewer to
believe that the government was taking sides in a doctrinal controversy.”288 But the
Court took sides in a religious controversy; the appropriate text of the Ten
Commandments has been widely contested in Jewish and Christian history, and it
is only Protestant versions of the commandments that have been upheld in the
Supreme Court. Justice Scalia also seemed unaware that “nonreligion” is now
gaining more adherents than the traditional religious faiths.289
Because of Justice O’Connor’s influential endorsement test and her usual role
as swing voter in Religion Clauses cases, Court observers were surprised when
Justice Stephen Breyer, not O’Connor, became the swing voter who maintained the
Texas Ten Commandments monument. Alone among the Justices, Breyer
mentioned tolerance at the beginning of his analysis; because there is no “simple
and clear” test of the Religion Clauses, he wrote:
One must refer instead to the basic purposes of those Clauses. They seek to
“assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all.” . . . .
They seek to avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social
290
conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike.

Those sentences were consistent with Breyer’s general theory of constitutional
interpretation, which looks to the purpose of the constitutional text in order to
resolve difficult questions.291
Breyer also wrote that context mattered in this “borderline” case; within the
setting of the Texas capitol, surrounded by monuments about Texas history, he
found the Ten Commandments were more secular than religious, more concerned
with moral edification than religious indoctrination, a conclusion supported (in his
opinion) by their uncontested presence on state grounds for forty years.292 As a
final point, Breyer worried about the cost of removing the monuments from the
park because a holding against the state “might well encourage disputes concerning
the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public
buildings across the Nation. And it could thereby create the very kind of
religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”293 In
other words, the removal of longstanding religious monuments was intolerant in
287. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 717-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
288. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 909 n.12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
289. See American Religious Identification Survey 2008, http://www.americanreligionsurveyaris.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
290. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted & emphasis added).
291. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
292. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700-03 (Breyer, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
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Justice Breyer’s eyes, even if the monuments were no longer very religious.
Breyer’s Establishment Clause analysis replicated the Free Exercise Clause
mistake diagnosed in the earlier section of this essay about gay marriage, where
free exercise improperly offered an excuse to impose one religion through force of
law rather than to be tolerant of all religions. Contradicting the core of the
Establishment Clause, Breyer’s analysis allowed the Court to favor one majority
religion that has been here longer than others—Protestant Christianity—in the
name of tolerance. Despite recognizing the proper purpose of the First
Amendment—tolerance for all—Justice Breyer, like Justice Scalia, privileged
traditional religion. Breyer’s flawed analysis confirms Professor Kurland’s point
that the Framers understood that establishment—the separation of church and
state—was necessary to protect toleration. Without separation, in the name of
tolerance the majority religion will always be preferred.
Justice Breyer’s opinion seemed to offer constitutional protection to Eagles
Ten Commandments monuments around the country, and it sounded the death knell
for the Society of Separationists’ challenge to the Ten Commandments monument
in Pleasant Grove City.294 If Van Orden precluded the Establishment Clause
challenges, then Summum was left with free speech only, and it brought that issue
to the Court, where the justices remain undecided about the interaction of free
speech and establishment.
Although Summum was litigated as a free speech and not an establishment
case, the justices acknowledged during oral argument and in the opinion that
establishment lurked in the background. Justice Scalia preemptively announced
that Summum could not win a future Establishment Clause challenge, warning
litigants and encouraging cities that there was no Establishment Clause violation in
Pioneer Park because it was “virtually identical” to the display in Austin, Texas:
The city ought not fear that today’s victory has propelled it from the Free Speech
Clause frying pan into the Establishment Clause fire. Contrary to respondent’s
intimations, there are very good reasons to be confident that the park displays do
not violate any part of the First Amendment. . . .
The city can safely exhale. Its residents and visitors can now return to enjoying
Pioneer Park’s wishing well, its historic granary—and, yes, even its Ten
Commandments monument—without fear that they are complicit in an
295
establishment of religion.

This strong conclusion on an unbriefed issue was consistent with Scalia’s argument
in the Ten Commandments cases that the government may prefer religion over
irreligion, and monotheism to polytheism: “With respect to public acknowledgment
of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the
Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in
294. In a different lawsuit, the Society of Separationists, represented by the same trial counsel as
Summum, had brought an Establishment Clause challenge to Pleasant Grove’s display of the Ten
Commandments monument. See Society of Separationists v. Pleasant Grove City, 416 F.3d 1239 (10th
Cir. 2005) (remanding in light of Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677, and McCreary County, 545 U.S. 844).
That litigation was dismissed, with prejudice, on remand. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Voluntary Dismissal Under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a), Soc’y of Separationists v. Pleasant Grove City, No.
2:03-CV-839 BSJ (D. Utah Feb. 15, 2006).
295. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139-40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis removed).
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unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”296
The other justices were not so conclusory about the Establishment Clause.
Justice Alito mentioned the Clause in his opinion for the Court.297 Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg suggested it would apply in future cases and warned against allowing
the new government speech doctrine to undermine establishment restrictions.298
Oddly enough, Justice Breyer failed to mention the Establishment Clause, not even
responding to Justice Scalia’s conclusion that the Utah problem was “virtually
identical” to the Texas monument spared by Breyer in Van Orden.299 Justice
Souter, who was usually an ardent proponent of the separation of church and state,
addressed the establishment issue in the most detail, musing over the unanswered
questions about the interaction of “government speech doctrine” and religion that
Summum engendered:
The case shows that it may not be easy to work out. After today’s decision,
whenever a government maintains a monument it will presumably be understood
to be engaging in government speech. If the monument has some religious
character, the specter of violating the Establishment Clause will behoove it to take
care to avoid the appearance of a flat-out establishment of religion, in the sense of
the government’s adoption of the tenets expressed or symbolized. In such an
instance, there will be safety in numbers, and it will be in the interest of a careful
government to accept other monuments to stand nearby, to dilute the appearance
of adopting whatever particular religious position the single example alone might
stand for. As mementos and testimonials pile up, however, the chatter may well
make it less intuitively obvious that the government is speaking in its own right
simply by maintaining the monuments.
If a case like that occurred, as suspicion grew that some of the permanent
displays were not government speech at all (or at least had an equally private
character associated with private donors), a further Establishment Clause
prohibition would surface, the bar against preferring some religious speakers over
others. . . . But the government could well argue, as a development of government
speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own views, it is free of the
Establishment Clause’s stricture against discriminating among religious sects or
groups. Under this view of the relationship between the two doctrines, it would be
easy for a government to favor some private religious speakers over others by its
300
choice of monuments to accept.

Justice Souter accurately identified the difficult problems that the Court’s
opinions have created; indeed Summum shows that cities already find ways “to
favor some private religious speakers over others by its choice of monuments to
accept.”301 The monuments accepted and protected are Christian and the rest are
not.
A tolerant First Amendment responds to Justice Souter’s concerns by
recognizing that religious symbols retain their religious identity in any setting and
that existing symbols may continue to stand only if they are surrounded by other
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1140-41 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1141-42 (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1142.
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religious symbols. Unlike the endorsement theory, which secularizes religious
symbols by surrounding them with teddy bears and balloons, tolerance
commonsensically recognizes that religious symbols are religious. The Ten
Commandments are religious in nature, as are the Seven Aphorisms, as befits their
source in God’s gift to human beings. Unlike the Scalia monotheism theory, which
allows the government to promote the religion of the Founders and of the
majority,302 toleration does not allow any one religion—or any one version of a
religion—to be recognized as true, as occurs when Protestant translations of the
Ten Commandments fill the public square. Unlike the Breyer borderline tolerance
theory, which worries about possible intolerance toward the majority religion and
religion in general,303 a tolerant First Amendment requires attention to all religions,
and should require new religious monuments to balance the old.
Consider as a model the City of Mission Viejo, California, which added a
Muslim holiday display to an intersection that already contained Jewish and
Christian decorations. The following year officials at first cancelled the display
because so many religious groups wanted to participate, but later found a park large
enough to accommodate displays from the ten to fifteen groups that applied to
mount their own distinctive religious symbols.304 The tolerant approach, of either
removing official religious symbols or surrounding them with other religious
symbols, could help the government to avoid the disingenuous arguments of
Pleasant Grove City and Austin, who insisted that the Ten Commandments related
to Utah and Texas history the same way that Pioneer Winter Corral, Pioneer Log
Cabin, Pioneer Water Well, Pioneer Granary, Pioneer Flour Mill Stone, Pioneer
Woman, and Heroes of the Alamo did.
Frank Buono, the plaintiff in the California cross case now before the U.S.
Supreme Court,305 appears to be a tolerant man. As a Roman Catholic, Buono does
not find the cross offensive; it is the core of his own religion. Instead, he filed a
lawsuit because he was “personally confronted with, and offended by, the
government’s favoritism of the cross over other symbols, religious or otherwise,
and he sues to redress his own offense.”306
Salazar v. Buono involves a Latin cross originally erected in 1934 (and
replaced several times over the years) on Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National
Preserve in San Bernardino County, California, by the Veterans of Foreign Wars as
part of a war memorial. The cross now sits on federal land. The federal district
court and the Ninth Circuit repeatedly ruled that because the cross is indisputably a
religious symbol—it represents Christianity and no other religion—it violates the
Establishment Clause and therefore must be removed.307
After the courts’ rulings of unconstitutionality, the National Park Service
[NPS] made plans to remove the cross, until Congress made several efforts to stop
302. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 700-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
304. Wade Clark Roof, Pluralism as a Culture: Religion and Civility in Southern California, 612
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 82, 82-83 (2007).
305. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313.
306. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Kempthorne v. Buono,
502 F.3d 1069 (2007) (No. 08-472).
307. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069.
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the Service’s actions. First, Congress blocked NPS from funding the removal of
the cross.308 Then Congress passed legislation trading the land under the cross to
the Veterans of Foreign War in exchange for other VFW property.309 This transfer
of religious symbols from public to private land is not unique; in another Summum
case, the City of Duchesne twice transferred a Ten Commandments monument to
private hands to avoid the request to display the Seven Aphorisms.310 During that
same time period, “NPS received a request from an individual seeking to build a
‘stupa’ (a dome-shaped Buddhist shrine) on a rock outcropping at a trailhead
located near the cross. NPS denied that request, citing the Code of Federal
Regulations as prohibiting the installation of a memorial without authorization.311
A hand-written note on the denial letter warns that ‘[a]ny attempt to erect a stupa
will be in violation of Federal Law and subject you to citation and/or arrest.’”312
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the question whether the
establishment violation can be avoided by transferring the property from
governmental to private hands.313 The Solicitor General has defended Congress’s
actions along the Breyer thesis; it is intolerant to remove the cross.314 As in the Ten
Commandments cases, the government’s creative energy has gone entirely to
finding a way to preserve Christian symbols rather than to worry about the
exclusion of groups like the Buddhists or the offense to Catholics like Buono.315
Like Summum, Buono threatens to succumb to the “tyranny of labels” as the
Court once again debates what is private and what is governmental without looking
at the underlying religious issues.316 If the government can transfer and therefore
relabel its monuments as private speech, it can avoid the Establishment Clause and
keep the country populated with religious monuments—of one religion.
Another labeling issue threatens Frank Buono, the plaintiff in the California
case, as the government contends he lacks standing to bring the case because “he
has no objection to the public display of a cross, but instead is offended that the
public land on which the cross is located is not also an open forum on which other
persons might display other symbols.”317
The philosophical father of tolerance, John Locke, questioned extending
toleration to Catholics (because their allegiance to the Pope made them dangerous
to the state) and atheists (because “[p]romises, covenants, and oaths, which are the
bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist”).318 It is also doubtful

308. Id. at 1073.
309. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004 § 8121(a), 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 (West,
Westlaw through 2009).
310. Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2007).
311. The regulation provides that: “The installation of a monument, memorial, tablet, structure, or
other commemorative installation in a park area without the authorization of the Director is prohibited.”
36 C.F.R. § 2.62(a) (2009).
312. Buono, 502 F.3d at 1072-73.
313. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313.
314. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, Buono, 502 F.3d 1069 (2008) (No. 05-55852).
315. See generally id.
316. Buono, 502 F.3d at 1069.
317. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 314, at I.
318. LOCKE, supra note 33.
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that the Founding Fathers desired to protect atheists.319 But the tolerance of the
U.S. Constitution extends far beyond Locke’s and the Framer’s limits. Although
the principle remains the same, it must be applied to new facts and circumstances.
“[T]he intolerance of late 18th-century Americans towards Catholics, Jews,
Moslems [sic], and atheists cannot be the basis of interpreting the Establishment
Clause today,”320 explained Justice Harry Blackmun in his opinion for the Court in
Allegheny County, the crèche and menorah case:
Precisely because of the religious diversity that is our national heritage, the
Founders added to the Constitution a Bill of Rights, the very first words of which
declare: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .” Perhaps in the early days of the
Republic these words were understood to protect only the diversity within
Christianity, but today they are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and
equality to “the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as
Islam or Judaism.” It is settled law that no government official in this Nation may
321
violate these fundamental constitutional rights regarding matters of conscience.

The jurisprudence of public displays, unfortunately, does not match Justice
Blackmun’s words, as the influential Catholic Justice Scalia’s analysis tells
Summum that the courts do not have to tolerate atheists, or polytheists, or even,
apparently, Gnostic Christianity.322 In the public displays area, the Court still
intolerantly promotes one true version of one true religion.
VI. CONCLUSION
As in the Framers’ era, today the religious pluralism of the United States
makes it impossible to identify a shared religion that all citizens can reasonably be
expected to endorse. As the intense debates about gay marriage described in Part
III confirmed, attempts to establish government according to religious principles
are divisive, a modern American form of the European Wars of Religion. No
religious or philosophical principle can resolve the controversies of a pluralist
society. Instead, today as in the 18th century, the best option is a legal and political
order based on constitutional tolerance.
The need for toleration arises in situations of pluralism, where citizens
disagree about essential truths. Citizens have a choice. They can insist that their
compatriots accept “the truth” and live according to it, or they can agree to disagree
about religious and philosophical truths and take the time to build a stable political
order built upon tolerance.
The principle of toleration has normative bite. In this essay, I identified three
claims about toleration that are missing from current First Amendment law and
politics. First, because toleration is a political and legal principle, toleration is
319. Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 839, 856 (1985/1986) (“If the Founders’ generation truly sought freedom for religious beliefs,
however, I find no evidence that they were equally concerned with freedom for irreligion.”).
320. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590 n.39 (citing Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to
Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L.REV. 875, 919-20 (1986)).
321. Id. at 589-90 (citations omitted).
322. McCreary County, 545 U.S.at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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skeptical about religious truth claims and accordingly denies the state the power to
enforce religious truth through force or law. Second, tolerance protects the
individual against the power of both church and state. Third, toleration must extend
beyond the diversity among Christian sects of old Europe and the young United
States and stretch in directions not anticipated by the Framers.
Following these standards modifies current law and politics. Under the
principle of tolerance, contentious issues like gay marriage are resolved according
to constitutional principles of liberty and equality rather than religious norms of
Christian love. Churches and religious organizations are held to neutral laws of
general applicability and not allowed special privileges to harm their members.
Government funding of religion is not permitted. Public Christian displays are
supplemented with the signs and symbols of other religions and philosophies. The
end result is less intolerant religion and more religious liberty.

